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SEATO RECORD

Vol. X No. 5 October, 1971

● Asian Scene ● Philippine Defence System ● The Karens

1954 - 1971

17th ANNIVERSARY ISSUE

SEATO RECORD

SEATO RECORD features significant events in South-East Asia, as well as activities of the Organization and its member nations. It reports statements which reflect attitudes or policies related to SEATO's role as a defensive organization.

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COVER:

Principal SEATO Day (September 8) events are captured in three pictures: **(Top left)** *A reception at SEATO Headquarters, Bangkok, attended by high-ranking government officials, diplomats and military officers including (from left to right) Thailand's Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn; SEATO Secretary-General Jesus Vargas; Chief of Staff, Supreme Command (Thailand), Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya, and Chief, SEATO Military Planning Office, Major-General R.A. Hay.* **(Top right)** *Presentation of SEATO undergraduate scholarships at Government House, Bangkok—Miss Sriwan Chermsiri of Mahidol University receives her scholarship from Lt. Gen. Sawaeng Senanarong.* **(Bottom right)** *SEATO Film Week in Bangkok—Queues form up outside the theatre where films from SEATO member nations are to be shown.*

ASIAN



In his annual public report for 1970-71—issued on SEATO Day (September 8)—SEATO Secretary-General Jesus Vargas comments on "The Asian Scene" and lists SEATO activities during the past year. His review of developments in Asia follow.....

A year which has encompassed many disturbing developments in Asia ended on a hopeful note with the news of President Nixon's proposed visit to China. The Washington-Peking agreement to Mr. Nixon's meeting with China's leaders has been widely acclaimed, not least in South-East Asia where Asians necessarily have a special interest in Chinese Communist words and actions. It is a move to be welcomed and recognized for what it is—a forward step in easing international tension.

It is imperative to our hopes for peace in Asia that we establish a dialogue with a country which has such a strong influence, for there can be no stability without the goodwill of Communist China and her 750 million people.

The fact that the United States and China talk to each other at the highest level must mean that both these great nations will have a clearer understanding of each other's views. That in itself is a positive gain, whatever else may happen at the talks.

The "ping-pong diplomacy" episode seems now to have been a genuine move in a series of steps towards rapprochement. However, a more substantial indication of a genuine softening of China's attitudes will emerge if at the planned Peking meeting Premier Chou En-lai gives President Nixon an undertaking that his country will abandon its past aggressive policies against nations that observe a democratic system of government. These policies, which have sought to impose Communism by force, have constituted the basic cause of the hostilities undermining the stability and progress of South-East Asia.

In accepting Premier Chou En-lai's invitation to go to Peking, President Nixon made it clear that his action in seeking a new relationship with Communist China will not be at the expense of America's old allies. This unequivocal declaration should allay any fears there might be. All nations should gain from a reduction of tensions and a better relationship between Washington and Peking.

It would be wrong, however, to expect too much from what will be a sensitive mission for Mr. Nixon. One visit can hardly provide a cure for all the ills of Asia, but it can be seen as the beginning of a debate where real differences are discussed and ultimate aims examined, shorn of misunderstanding and without the polemics of recent years.

It is my very great hope that the Washington-Peking dialogue will lead eventually to some appreciable relaxation by Communist China of her aggressive tendencies and, even more importantly, to an outright renunciation of her support for the insurgent and subversive activities of the endemic Communist Parties in the developing countries of Asia. Unless such a renunciation eventuates, any improvement in the relations of any two or more powers involved in the affairs of Asia is of no real value to free Asians.

During the past year the many peace formulas put forward by the Free World to end hostilities in Indo-China were all rejected out of hand by the Communists. The Communist leaders also kept up their policy of fostering subversion and insurgency throughout the area. I assert unequivocally that there could have been peace in Vietnam today—and in Laos and the Khmer Republic—



SCENE

if the Communists had been prepared to follow the spirit of reasonableness of those democratic nations which have been seeking a just and lasting settlement to the conflict.

Unfortunately the fighting goes on and the people continue to suffer. Indeed during the year there has been no relaxation of Communist aggression. From Burma in the west to Indonesia in the south and the Philippines in the east, countries are facing that menace.

In the Khmer Republic, the Communists have used the deposition of Sihanouk as a pretext to extend their military aggression into that country with the objectives of regaining the sanctuaries that had been vital to their operations against South Vietnam and of securing control over the rice-growing areas in the eastern provinces. In southern Laos, also, they have stepped up their military action to improve the supply system on which their operations in South Vietnam depend.

These extensions of open aggression must be considered in conjunction with the objectives of the Peking-sponsored concept of a United Front of Vietnamese Peoples and the nature of the latest Communist proposals for a settlement in Laos. From this I assess that the Communist powers regard the three former Indo-Chinese States as a single area of war. If the Communist ventures succeed, their most likely objective will be a settlement covering all three States on terms that will ensure Communist control over the whole area.

Paradoxically, peace negotiations covering the three States have been the objective of the Western powers, which have consistently called for the convening of a new Geneva-type conference. The objective is to restore peace to the area under conditions that would enable each country to choose its own form of government without external influence from either side. However, efforts to this end have been thwarted by the Communists.

The Communists' attitude springs from their basic objective of spreading their ideology and their political control. They know that their prospects of achieving this objective at an international conference will be better if their position is strong, and they see this strength in terms of the domination of territory. This explains why both the USSR and Communist China are maintaining their massive military and economic aid to North Vietnam. It also explains why Peking continues to exhort Hanoi to persevere with its "revolutionary struggle" and why Moscow has so far refused to fulfil its responsibilities as one of the Co-Chairmen of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Conferences. However, I think there are two factors that may move the Communists towards convening an international conference.

Firstly, there is the growing military and political strength of the South Vietnamese Government. If the present trends in South Vietnam can be maintained after Allied forces are progressively withdrawn, the Communists may recognise that their designs for territorial occupation cannot be realized. They may then decide to accept a solution that falls short of their full terms. It is therefore important that Western aid to South Vietnam in the form of military equipment and economic assistance should be continued, in line with the Nixon Doctrine.

Secondly, the dispute between the two major Communist powers is becoming more intense. The Soviet Union has for some time been concerned over China's ambitions, and this concern has been increased by China's progress in the fields of nuclear and missile experimentation and by her initiatives to improve her international standing. Significantly, the USSR did not invite Peking to send a delegation to its Party Congress. It has also shown its disapproval of Peking's efforts to establish an influence with the East European Communist States of Yugoslavia and Rumania.

The USSR, while maintaining its support to North Vietnam's war effort, has kept its options open in the political sphere. If, therefore, Moscow assesses that the time has come to prevent China's attainment of hegemony over South-East Asia, it can do this as a Geneva Co-Chairman by acceding to the Western world's demands for an international conference.

With regard to China's international initiatives in the past year, I see these as falling into two categories: efforts to establish better relations with some governments, and efforts to influence public opinion.

There is no fundamental reason why Communist and

non-Communist countries should not exist side by side, enjoying political, cultural and economic contacts to their mutual advantage. The achievement of such a relationship has been proved possible in Europe. It could also be achieved in South-East Asia if Red China gave up her aggressive policies and her support for subversion and insurgency in the developing countries of Asia. Such a situation would bring about conditions in which all countries could devote their talents and energy to the development of the region's full potential in peaceful co-operation.

SOUTH VIETNAM

WITH the Paris Talks now in their fourth year, the Communists have continued to prevent a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam war.

The Vietnamese Communists rejected outright the constructive five-point peace plan that President Nixon advanced in October, 1970. In essence, the President proposed a ceasefire-in-place to be supervised by international observers, the convening of an Indo-China Peace Conference to deal with the conflict in the whole of Indo-China, negotiation of an agreed timetable for the complete withdrawal of American and other Allied forces as part of an overall settlement, joint efforts by both sides to find a political settlement that would reflect the genuine will of the South Vietnamese, and the immediate release of all prisoners-of-war.

In reply the Communists pressed the "Viet Cong solution", the essence of which is the unconditional withdrawal of all US and other Allied forces by a fixed deadline and the formation of an Administration in Saigon that would include Communist representation but specifically exclude the present South Vietnamese leaders. To exert pressure on the negotiating position of the Allies, the prisoner-of-war question is now being linked with an undertaking that all American and other Allied forces be withdrawn by a set date within 1971.

Within South Vietnam, however, much progress has been achieved as a result of the successes of the Government's pacification programme, its efforts to re-establish democratic processes and its military gains.

Government control has risen to a record of about 95 per cent of the population, and only 4.6 per cent of the people are now living in areas where control is still being contested between the Government and the Communists. On the other hand, Communist control has fallen to its lowest level of approximately 0.1 per cent of the population—18,000 out of a total of almost 18 million. The launching in March of a new national programme, the 1971 Community Defence and Local Development Plan, is expected to accelerate pacification efforts in South Vietnam.

In June, 1970, elections were held for 44 provincial and six city councils; nation-wide senatorial elections were held in August, 1970. The enthusastic participation of the voters in these elections, despite Communist propaganda and terrorist activities, is an indication of the restoration of the processes of democracy. I am optimistic that this healthy trend will continue in the August elections to the House of Representatives and the Presidential election in October.

The military scene is equally encouraging. The initiative in the conduct of the war now belongs to the South Vietnamese Government. A major factor in this is the success achieved by the South Vietnamese incursion into southern Laos (Operation Lam Son 719) which, coupled with the earlier Allied moves against the Communist sanctuary areas in eastern Cambodia, seriously disrupted the supply and infiltration network of the Communists. A second factor is the growing effectiveness of South Vietnamese Armed Forces, which has fully justified the Allied policy of "Vietnamization". Complementing this favourable development is the improvement in the quality of South Vietnamese regional and popular forces which has increased Government capability to prevent the Communists from regaining control of the countryside. The third major factor stems from the success of the pacification programme which has weakened the military organization of the Communists and reduced their capability for guerrilla operations. Fourthly, there are indications that the Vietnamese Communists, as a matter of both strategy and necessity, are diverting some of their military strength to the Khmer Republic.

Encouraging as these trends are, they do not necessarily mean that conditions conducive to a negotiated settlement are likely to occur. Although the Soviet Union would probably favour a settlement, it is maintaining its aid to North Vietnam. Communist China continues to urge the North Vietnamese to carry on their "war of liberation" and is furnishing material support to North Vietnam while paying lip service to the "Viet Cong overall solution". Moreover, the unification of the whole of Vietnam remains a basic objective of the Hanoi leadership. Despite signs of domestic uncertainties in the allocation of priorities in their war efforts, the North Vietnamese will continue their aggression in the hope that they may improve their military position and gain acceptance of their conditions for a settlement.

LAOS

THE military situation in Laos remains critical, primarily because of the aggressive activities of North Vietnamese troops, now estimated to number 70,000. This military force, in opposition to the legally constituted Government, is a breach of the undertakings given by Hanoi in the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements to respect the independence and sovereignty of Laos and to withdraw its forces from the Kingdom. It

has not withdrawn its forces and in fact has increased them.

The Communists have three main objectives in Laos. Firstly, they are seeking to bring as much of the country as possible under their control so that in any future government established after peace negotiations the Pathet Lao may secure a dominant position. Secondly, their increased military operations—particularly in Southern Laos, where they have captured the town of Paksong and now control most of the Bolovens Plateau—are designed to counter the effects of the successful South Vietnamese Operation Lam Son 719 against the Communist logistic-support system close to the South Vietnamese border. Specifically, they are seeking to expand the Ho Chi Minh Trail farther to the west, both to acquire routes less vulnerable to ground attack and to augment the total capacity of the supply network. Their third objective is to exert such pressure on neutralist Lao Premier Prince Souvanna Phouma that he will be forced to accept unfavourable terms of settlement in order to save his country from further devastation.

This third objective may be clearly seen in the latest Communist "peace proposals" presented by the Pathet Lao to Prince Souvanna Phouma on May 12. These demand a cessation of American bombing over the whole of Laos as a pre-requisite for negotiations on the formation of a new Provisional Coalition Government. No undertaking is given that all foreign troops—including, of course, the 70,000 North Vietnamese—shall be withdrawn from the country under supervision of the International Control Commission, as Prince Souvanna Phouma had proposed. The Government rejected these "peace proposals".

Assessing these three objectives in combination, I conclude that the activities of the Communists in Laos are part of their broader strategy in respect of the three Indo-Chinese States. The Communists are unlikely to agree to any settlement of the Laos situation that does not materially enhance their military and political prospects in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

The Government and the Pathet Lao have sought support for their respective causes both within Laos itself and abroad. Prince Souvanna Phouma undertook an overseas tour in September, 1970, during which he appealed for world support for his Government's policies. In October he issued another White Book on Hanoi's aggression.

The Pathet Lao have publicised such celebrations as the 25th anniversary of the declaration of independence by the Lao Issara (Lao Independence Movement); the 15th anniversary of the Neo Lao Hak Xat, their present front organization; and the first anniversary of the so-called "Summit Conference of Indo-Chinese Peoples." They have also sent numerous delegations abroad and have received many delegations from Communist countries.

The attitudes of the Soviet Union and Communist China towards the Laos problem reflect their rivalry for leadership of the Communist movement in South-East Asia.

Moscow, in supporting the latest Pathet Lao peace proposals, is probably motivated by a desire to bring some stability to the area on terms favourable to Communism. It is perhaps also concerned that a prolonged conflict could ultimately benefit Communist China.

Peking, which hitherto has opposed peace negotiations because they run counter to Mao Tsetung's theories on "protracted struggle until final victory," has also given some support to the Pathet Lao proposals, presumably because they are couched in terms that would assure that victory. Peking, however, is basically less interested in a negotiated settlement of the Laos problem than in taking steps to establish its own influence throughout South-East Asia. In mid-February, for instance, the Communist Chinese reportedly resumed work on the road they are constructing through northwest Laos towards the Mekong River. This road is now open as far as Muong Houn, about 35 miles from the Thai border.

CAMBODIA
(The Khmer Republic)

AN estimated 45,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops are now operating against Government forces in the Khmer Republic in violation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements.

Having secured control over large areas, particularly in the north and north-east, they have extended their attacks against selected provincial towns and Government positions throughout the whole country. Their offensive is focussed in the south-east, on the east bank of the Mekong River, to threaten the defences of Phnom Penh and to acquire supply routes that could be used for an attack on the capital at the end of the current rainy season.

Communist military operations in the Khmer Republic are intended to gain sufficient control to enable them to establish base areas for operations in South Vietnam, a requirement rendered imperative by the disruption of their original sanctuaries in the east of the Khmer Republic. They also have a political connotation in that the achievement of such control would facilitate the development of a Communist administration that could be used to weaken the Khmer Government.

In the longer term, the operations in the Khmer Republic must also be seen as part of the Communist plan to gain control throughout the region so as to acquire a position of strength at any future peace negotiations.

To counter the Communist actions, the Khmer Government has improved its defensive capability. It has expanded its armed forces, but they are still deficient

in training, equipment and logistic support, in spite of military and economic aid from friendly countries.

Despite the war, the Khmer Republic has made progress in the domestic political field. There is no evidence that the brief political crisis following Marshal Lon Nol's illness has adversely affected the solidarity of the Government. On the contrary, the manner in which the situation was resolved has renewed faith among the people that the leadership is determined to provide a democratic form of government and to undertake economic reforms. This is of importance as the Government needs to achieve a broader popular base in support of its plan to promulgate a new Constitution.

The Peking-based "Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia" of the deposed Prince Sihanouk continues to issue appeals to the Khmers to rise against the Phnom Penh Government, but these have met such little response that the majority of the anti-Government forces comprise the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. Sihanouk has also given his public support to the so-called "liberation movements" in South Vietnam and Laos. Adopting the policy of his Peking mentors, he favours a protracted war rather than any negotiated settlement that would not ensure his reinstatement. To achieve this objective, he is prepared to allow his country to suffer the depredations of war.

Internationally, this "government" has made some gains. It has been recognized by 25 countries and organizations, most of which are sympathetic to the Communist cause.

The Soviet Union and the East European Communist countries, however, are adopting an ambivalent attitude towards events in the Khmer Republic. While expressing support for Sihanouk, they have stopped short of recognition and have retained their embassies in Phnom Penh, presumably to have political manoeuvrability as the regional situation develops.

THAILAND

THE Communists continued their subversion and insurgency in Thailand by acts of terrorism and anti-Government propaganda. Both subversive and insurgent activities increased in the north. Insurgency also showed an increase in the south, but the far south experienced fewer incidents. In the north-east, although active insurgency declined, there was an increase in subversion.

The Communists have sought to harass the authorities and to intimidate the local populace by staging attacks and ambushes against Government officials and outposts. Major terrorist activities occurred in the southern provinces of Surat Thani, Nakhon Si Thammarat and Phatthalung, and in the northern provinces of Chiang Rai, Tak, Nan, Phitsanulok and Phetchabun.

In the field of subversive propaganda, the Communists have sought to undermine the authority and prestige of the Royal Thai Government by exploiting local issues and by falsely representing Government motivations in both domestic and foreign affairs.

The Government has vigorously pursued its counter-insurgency and counter-subversion policies. It has pushed ahead with social and economic programmes intended to raise living standards and remove the grievances that can be exploited by the Communists. It has also applied resolute countermeasures against insurgents while showing leniency towards those who realize their past errors and come over the Government side.

The Government has given greater emphasis to operations against Communist hide-outs, using both military and police units. The insurgents have suffered casualties and several major terrorist hide-outs have been destroyed. Between February and early June, five Communist camps in the south were captured.

Government campaigns against Communists in the north also resulted in the capture in February of a guerrilla camp headquarters. In the northernmost Chiang Rai Province, a month-long operation by Army troops with air support in April resulted in high casualties for the insurgents—some 130 killed and 150 wounded.

The insurgents obtain their weapons, ammunition and other supplies mainly from Red China through Laos in the north and north-east and through smuggling by sea in the south. To counter this, the Government intensified its surveillance of the Mekong River and increased coastal patrols in the southern waters. Over 80 persons were arrested in May and charged with supplying arms to the insurgents. These moves have reduced terrorist activities, although a fully effective surveillance system is difficult to achieve because of Thailand's long sea and land borders.

In the eastern provinces, the Government has taken steps to prevent the spread of Communist activities from the Khmer Republic into Thailand.

I believe that the Communists will try to step up their terrorist and subversive activities in Thailand in the months ahead. They are also likely to strengthen the apparatus of the proscribed Communist Party, whose main task is to generate more local support for the foreign-inspired activities.

BURMA

BURMA is confronted with Communist-inspired insurgency, discontent among ethnic groups, a run-down economy, political challenge to General Ne Win and his Government, and a number of disruptive social disorders such as banditry, smuggling and lawlessness.

The Communist insurgent threat stems mainly from the activities of the pro-Peking Burmese Communist Party (White Flag), or BCP (WF), although its fortunes have declined. This decline was caused partly by the Government's intensified military operations, in which several of the insurgent leaders were killed or captured and casualties inflicted on their supporters, and partly by internal disputes over loyalties to contending leaders.

These factors, however, are unlikely to have a permanent effect on BCP (WF) operations. It continues to receive material support from Communist China, which also serves as a base for insurgency training and ideological motivation.

In line with her policy of spreading revolution through guerrilla warfare, Communist China will maintain her support for the BCP (WF), albeit clandestinely. Indeed, the very month (March) that Peking and Rangoon restored full diplomatic relations as a token of improved relations at Government level, it was reported that the Communist Chinese assisted the BCP (WF) in setting up a clandestine radio station, "The Voice of the People of Burma", that has since broadcast anti-Government propaganda.

The BCP (WF) is, moreover, seeking to widen its base by co-ordinating its activities with those of other dissident groups, including those that are non-Communist, especially in Kachin State. Any success in this move would add to the Government's problems, as lack of unity has hitherto been a major factor in limiting the effectiveness of the dissident groups.

General Ne Win continues to face the manoeuvering of the former Prime Minister U Nu, who is seeking support to enable him to challenge the present administration and to restore parliamentary democracy in Burma. In an attempt to stabilize the situation, Ne Win has introduced a number of reforms. In June, he appointed four civilians to the ruling Revolutionary Council, and formed a new 30-man civilian consultative body to advise that Council. That same month his Burma Socialist Programme Party opened its first Congress, which adopted a new Constitution intended to transform the party into a "people' s party". The Congress also discussed a national plan for economic development. The Government has established more schools in rural areas and introduced various public health measures, but these are limited to the funds available for such purposes.

The Soviet Union and the East European Communist countries are seeking to extend their influence in Burma through diplomatic, commercial and cultural contacts, in accordance with the policy they are following throughout South-East Asia as a counter to the Communist Chinese policy of supporting armed insurgency.

THE PHILIPPINES

THERE has been no major change in the situation in the Philippines. The two rival Communist groups—one pro-Moscow and the other Peking-oriented—pose a threat to Philippine security as they seek to establish a Communist society in the country. The nature of this threat remains mainly subversive and partly insurgent.

Both parties maintained their agitation and propaganda activities, chiefly through front organizations among the youth, students, intellectuals and workers.

These various front organizations made use of workers' strikes and student demonstrations to put out anti-United States and anti-Government propaganda and to advocate leftist causes.

In the field of insurgency, the three main groups—the military arms of the pro-Soviet and pro-Peking parties and the non-party Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB)—continue to maintain a defensive posture.

In an attempt, however, to raise their military capability to a level that will enable them to conduct active guerrilla warfare these groups are seeking to organize a wider base of active members. In this context the pro-Peking group poses the most immediate threat. The largest and most militant of the three, it is extending activities outside the present trouble area, Central Luzon, although it now has the capacity to conduct only small-scale activities.

Both Communist China and the Soviet Union are giving support to the local Communists by beaming propaganda broadcasts into the country. *Peking Radio* now puts out regular broadcasts in English, Pilipino and Mandarin devoted mainly to biased reports of local affairs, exaggerated accounts of Communist accomplishments, Mao's thoughts, and attacks against "US imperialism" and "Soviet revisionism". *Moscow Radio* concentrates on encouraging anti-American sentiments in the Philippines and seeks to exploit the growing disposition of some Filipinos to establish closer ties with the USSR.

The Soviet Union has invited Filipino technicians and professionals to visit Russia. A number of Soviet nationals and groups, including the Beriozka Dance Troupe and a delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Soviet of Nationalities, visited the Philippines during the year.

Communist China also continues to send propaganda materials to the Philippines and to encourage visits to the Chinese Mainland by local Overseas Chinese and by leftist-inclined Filipinos. A number of local Chinese made such visits during the year, and in May Peking invited a group of Filipino businessmen and newsmen to visit China, the first such group to enter the Mainland from the Philippines since the Peking regime was established in 1949.

MALAYSIA

MALAYSIA returned to parliamentary rule in February, having been governed since May, 1969, by a National Operations Council under Tun Abdul Razak, who in September, 1970, succeeded Tunku Abdul Rahman as Prime Minister. This Council has been dissolved, and the co-ordination of security measures is now in the hands of a National Security Council.

Communal relations are superficially cordial, but there is some racial tension which could threaten Malaysia's security. The anti-sedition law passed earlier this year has banned public discussion of racial issue and the Government has taken steps to strengthen the position of the Malays by giving them greater involvement in industry and commerce.

Peking-oriented Communist subversion and insurgency continues to tax the resources of the Malaysian Security Forces in both East and West Malaysia. In West Malaysia an estimated 1,200 Communist terrorists are operating near the Thai border. They are slowly penetrating farther south in an apparent attempt to reoccupy the areas from which they operated during the Emergency in the 1950s, and are attempting to enlist Malay as well as local ethnic Chinese support.

The authorities, however, are taking realistic counter-measures. In June, following a Communist ambush near Ipoh, they launched a major operation in the area and set up joint police and civilian committees to deal with the threat.

The Malaysian and Thai authorities continue to work together to counter Communist subversion and insurgency, and the Joint Thai-Malaysian Border Committee meets regularly. The two countries have co-ordinated their naval patrol operations and have agreed that their forces may penetrate up to five miles across each other's border in "hot pursuit" of Communists.

In East Malaysia, the authorities work closely with the Indonesian Government and are containing the threat posed by the guerrilla forces of the Sarawak Communist Organization. In December, following an upsurge of Communist guerrilla activity, the Prime Minister called for the setting-up of community-service units and more civic-action committees to win support for the Government and to prevent Communist infiltration of schools. In March "Operation Hentam", launched in the Muara Tebas coastal area of Sarawak's First Division, led to the killing of 13 armed Communist terrorists, the East Malaysian Security Forces' biggest success in recent years.

In foreign affairs, Malaysia leans towards a non-aligned policy and has advocated the neutralization of South-East Asia, to be guaranteed by the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China. In April, however, together with Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the Malaysians signed a new Five-Power Defence Agreement which provides for consultation between these nations in the event of any external armed attack against Malaysia or Singapore.

Relations with the Soviet Union and East European Communist countries have continued to develop, and Malaysia's exports to the Soviet Union are now running at US$70 million a year.

Malaysia's relations with Communist China have improved. In February, Peking offered aid worth US$ 208,333 to the Malaysian Red Cross for flood relief. In May a private Malaysian trade delegation visited Peking, and in June Peking agreed to buy Malaysia's present and future rubber stockpiles. The Malaysian Government, however, has made it clear that Communist China's support for subversion and insurgency in the country remains a serious obstacle to the establishment of full diplomatic relations.

SINGAPORE

THE Singapore economy has continued to flourish, and both foreign and domestic investment are at a high level. Government measures to expand and diversify Singapore's industry should ease the country's unemployment problem and offset the effect of the progressive reduction of British troops in 1971.

Singapore was a signatory to the Five-Power Defence Agreement drawn up in London in April.

In present circumstances, the pro-Communist Barisan Sosialis (BSS) is not a serious threat to the People's Action Party, which is providing a stable and effective Government. Having boycotted the parliamentary process, the BSS is pursuing a policy of "extra-parliamentary struggle", which takes the form of occasional "anti-imperialist" demonstrations. Internal disagreements on policy and on ideological matters have prevented the BSS from taking any positive or effective anti-Government action.

Singapore has continued to foster good relations with the Soviet Union and Communist countries in East Europe. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew visited Moscow in September, 1970, and in June, 1971, the Singapore Government announced the appointment of its first Ambassador to the Soviet Union. A Soviet mission visited Singapore in February, 1971, to discuss the possibility of increasing repair and bunkering facilities for Soviet merchant shipping in Singapore. Trade between the two countries is increasing.

Singapore maintains considerable commercial contacts with Communist China, although Peking does not recognize Singapore as a State. Four companies incor-

porated in Communist China, including the Bank of China, have branches in Singapore under local management.

The susceptibility of the predominantly Chinese population to pro-Peking elements is a potential threat to Singapore's stability. In May, four editorial staff members of a leading Chinese-language newspaper were arrested after publishing a series of articles extolling Communist China. In the same month, two English-language newspapers were closed down on the grounds that they had links with Communists and with others engaged in operations harmful to the interests of the State.

INDONESIA

INDONESIA has continued to make progress both politically and economically. The Government of President Suharto remains effectively in control of the country, the Government-backed Sekber Golkar group having won a large majority over the nine political parties opposing it in the July general elections.

The President launched an anti-corruption campaign in the latter half of 1970 along the lines recommended by a special committee. He has also responded to criticism of the influence of the Armed Forces by reducing the military establishment.

The State Budget announced in January was characterized by increases in revenue, in national development and in salaries for Government employees. Unemployment is still widespread, but the rate of inflation has been reduced to about nine per cent a year.

Continuing foreign investment is indicative of confidence in the country's future. In August, 1970, agreement was reached on the rescheduling of Indonesia's US$800 million debt to the Soviet Union and on the resumption of Soviet aid. This agreement, which followed similar agreements with Indonesia's Western creditors and Japan, provided for the repayment of the country's debt over a period of 30 years, starting from the end of 1970. Rescheduling agreements have also been signed with Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. In December, the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, comprising Indonesia's creditor nations, agreed to provide the country with a US$640 million credit for 1971-72.

In the field of foreign affairs, Indonesia has maintained her policy of non-alignment. The debt-repayment agreement with the USSR led to an improvement in relations between the two countries, but Indonesia remains concerned at Moscow's attempts to expand its influence in South-East Asia. The Indonesian Government has encouraged local businessmen to increase trade with Communist China and has indicated its willingness to resume diplomatic relations with Peking provided that the latter ceases its subversive activities against Indonesia. Communist China has not responded to this initiative.

The proscribed Communist Party of Indonesia remains internally disorganized. However, the preparations for the General Elections provided it with an opportunity to attempt infiltration of other parties and organizations. With the objective of creating disorder, the party also instigated a number of acts of sabotage, but the Administration has control of the situation.

In West Kalimantan, the Indonesian Government is closely co-operating with the Malaysian security forces to deal with Communist elements in the common border area. ■

SEATO
Report 1970-71

Available free of charge from the
Public Information Office,
SEATO Headquarters,
P.O. Box 517, Bangkok,
Thailand.

17th Anniversary

SEATO

Amid rapidly changing conditions on the international scene, SEATO remained a centre of stability both for defence and for expanding the perimeters of development of the Treaty nations. This statement was made by President Marcos of the Philippines in his message to SEATO on September 8, the 17th anniversary of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization.

Confidence in the ability of SEATO to respond to the changing needs of the situation was expressed in all other messages sent by SEATO Council Ministers from various member countries and from Secretary-General Jesus Vargas to mark the signing of the common defence pact in Manila in 1954.

Equally important was the reiteration by member countries of their continued support of the Organization and its efforts in the cause of peace in South-East Asia.

Full texts of SEATO Day messages are as follows:-

AUSTRALIA

Nigel Bowen, Minister for Foreign Affairs

THIS year, as in recent years, SEATO Day is being observed against the background of continuing hostilities within the Treaty area.

Free world forces have for over six years made a major contribution to the defence of the Republic of Vietnam. In doing so, they have responded both to the obligations which they assumed when they signed the Manila Treaty in 1954 and to the requests of a regional government whose independence was being challenged. One result of their assistance has been that the Republic of Vietnam is now more able than ever before to assume the burdens of its own defence.

Elsewhere in Indo-China there are continued attacks on the independence of sovereign governments. Laos has been subjected to North Vietnamese assaults on its territory. North Vietnamese forces have entrenched themselves inside the Khmer Republic and, notwithstanding the valiant efforts of the Khmer Government to expel the invaders, there seems no early prospect for the return of peace.

But there is cause of hope in developments in South-East Asia. Many countries of the area are enjoying higher levels of prosperity in conditions of peace and stability. Regional co-operation exists in many areas in a more real sense than has been the case in the past. The Five Power arrangements for the defence of Malaysia and Singapore are but one example of the co-operation.

The recent willingness of the People's Republic of China to enter into dialogue with other countries great and small and the forthcoming visit of the President of the United States to Peking are events full of significance for the future of South-East Asia.

The Australian Government hopes that these events will contribute to the return of peace and to a more normal and stable situation in the area. We hope that these events will truly be a step towards the resolution of problems which have long confronted the area.

Australia looks forward to hosting the 1972 meeting of the SEATO Council in Canberra. We offer to the Secretary-General and his staff our full co-operation for the success of that meeting and our wholehearted support in the year ahead.

Day messages

NEW ZEALAND

Sir Keith Holyoake, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister

ON the occasion of the 17th anniversary of the signing of the Manila Treaty, I am pleased to reaffirm the support of the New Zealand Government for the principles of collective security and for the work of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization. New Zealand places considerable value on the opportunity to contribute to the peace and security of South-East Asia through its membership of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization.

In the past year the nations of South-East Asia have shown increasing strength and self-confidence. They have shown a desire to stand on their own feet and grapple with the problems of their own area. Although there has been little progress towards a political settlement of the war in Indo-China, the trends in the military situation have been encouraging.

At the SEATO Council Meeting in London in April, SEATO member nations reiterated their support for the continued efforts of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States to negotiate a peaceful solution to the war.

Seventeen years have passed since the signing of the Manila Treaty. In that time there have been great changes in South-East Asia in the economic, social and political fields. SEATO has shown itself responsive to these changes, adapting its procedures and plans to keep abreast of the times.

Insurgency and subversion remain one of the most serious threats against the countries of the region and SEATO has increasingly been focussing its attention on this important problem. At the same time, SEATO has continued to promote economic development within the area where this is appropriate in a SEATO context.

The member countries of SEATO have welcomed the emergence of the growing network of regional organizations in South-East Asia which are contributing to the broad cohesiveness and stability of the entire region. SEATO itself as a regional defence grouping falls into this pattern. It is lending support and security to the region at a time of rapid change.

In the unlikely event of open attack against any member, the commitment to act against the common danger remains in force. I believe SEATO continues to have an important role to play in South-East Asia.

On this occasion of SEATO Day, I am pleased to extend the good wishes of the New Zealand Government to Secretary-General Vargas and his staff, and to all fellow SEATO member countries.

PHILIPPINES



President Marcos

ON behalf of my Government and the Filipino people, I am proud and pleased to extend congratulations to the South-East Asia Treaty Organization on its 17th anniversary, a milestone marked amid rapidly changing conditions on the international scene, and with the Asian region still agonized by military and ideological conflict.

Against this background, therefore, it is comforting to many peace-loving Asians that the SEATO remains a centre of stability, all the more strong today because

of the unity of the Treaty members and because of the increasing capability of the Organization, both for defence and for expanding the perimeters of development of the Treaty nations.

Let me reiterate here my country's determination to continue to support every essential endeavour of the SEATO, particularly such undertakings as would further promote a climate of security and well-being among nations in the region, such that emergent nations will be able to pursue nation-building with equanimity and singleness of purpose.

My compliments to SEATO and my best wishes for new achievements in the interest of peace and freedom.

Carlos P. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs

THE Republic of the Philippines joins its friends in the South-East Asia Treaty Organization in celebrating the 17th anniversary of the signing of the Manila Treaty.

The South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty has fulfilled its role as an effective deterrent against aggression in the Treaty area for almost two decades. It has also provided a central machinery for political and military consultations among the member countries and for the harmonization of their co-operative endeavours in the economic and technical fields.

We mark this year's SEATO Day in the midst of significant political changes affecting South-East Asia. The developing rapprochement between two major powers has brought about a new element in contemporary East-West relations which we in SEATO may usefully analyze and interpret in accordance with our principles and objectives.

The Organization may study whether these developments have ushered in a new and different situation which may require SEATO to take a fresh orientation.

But even as we look into the significance and implications of these events, we should always be reminded of the unchanging realities of our region, particularly of the economic and social aspirations of our peoples. The various functions which our Organization has successfully performed during the past 17 years has demonstrated the relevance of SEATO to the multi-faceted struggle of the nations of South-East Asia to achieve a better standard of living and to preserve internal stability and peace.

In the furtherance of these objectives, the Republic of the Philippines will continue to support the SEATO alliance.

Finally, I should like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the Philippine Government, to commend the Secretary-General of the SEATO Secretariat and his staff for the successful management of SEATO activities during the past year.

THAILAND

Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Affairs

THIS year marks the 17th anniversary of the signing of the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty. This is an occasion both for appraising the developments of the past and for looking forward to the future.

Since its inception 17 years ago, SEATO has witnessed many changes within the Treaty area, and has by and large been able to respond to the changing needs of the situation.

Now we are witnessing some major international developments which have a direct bearing on the conditions of peace and security in South-East Asia. It is too early to speculate on the potentials of the new developments. At present we can only hope that they may lead to the lessening of tensions in this part of the world.

In the present state of uncertainty, we can hardly afford to be too optimistic about the prospects of recent developments. Neither should we indulge ourselves in wishful thinking. On the contrary, we have to exert greater energy and exercise caution sufficiently to meet any new challenges facing our Organization as well as our respective countries.

At this important juncture, it is an opportune time therefore to remind ourselves of the aspirations which underlie our joint efforts in this association as clearly enunciated in the Pacific Charter. We should strengthen our common purpose and direct it to fulfill the ever-increasing demands of constructive co-operation among the member countries.

While the threats to peace and stability in the Treaty area have not appreciably decreased, it is necessary for us not only to stand firm in our common resolve to resist various forms of aggression but to do everything possible to encourage those who at present advocate the outmoded scheme of domination and subjugation to join with us in more peaceful pursuits and to share with us the benefits of positive co-operation in many fields of human endeavour.

In this, SEATO can still play a useful role to promote stability, economic progress and social well-being of the peoples in this region.

Thus we can be better prepared to meet new changes and to overcome new challenges in the years ahead, and look forward with confidence to a future of peace and prosperity in South-East Asia as deeply desired by all SEATO members.

On this commemorative occasion, and on behalf of the Government and the people of Thailand, it gives me great pleasure to convey cordial felicitations to the peoples and Governments of all SEATO member countries and to express sincere appreciation to the Secretary-General and his staff for their devoted efforts in furtherance of the aims and objectives of our Organization.

UNITED KINGDOM



Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Foreign Secretary

IN April of this year, the British Government had the great honour and pleasure of being hosts to the 16th Council Meeting of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization.

I now have much pleasure in congratulating the Organization on the 17th anniversary of the signing of the Manila Pact, and in reiterating Great Britain's firm support.

The thoughtful and stimulating exchanges which we had at the April Council Meeting showed that all member countries are keen to ensure that SEATO should continue to be able to evolve and to face the changing problems of South-East Asia, as it has done in the past seventeen years.

The United Kingdom will continue to play a full part in this and all other SEATO activities, as part of its efforts for the maintenance of peace in the whole of South-East Asia.

I take this opportunity to send my warm greetings to the Secretary-General and his staff, and to express the British Government's appreciation of all their efforts, past and present, on behalf of the Organization.

UNITED STATES



William P. Rogers, Secretary of State

SEVENTEEN years ago today the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty was signed in Manila. From that day to this, the Organization brought into being by that Treaty has made a significant contribution to the growth and stability of South-East Asia. It therefore gives me particular pleasure on this anniversary to send my greetings and those of President Nixon to SEATO, to its distinguished Secretary-General, and to the member nations and their leaders.

This past year has not brought to South-East Asia the peace we seek. But progress toward that goal has been made, and we can hope for even greater progress in the year ahead.

The final communique of the 16th SEATO Council Meeting in London this spring reaffirmed SEATO's desire for a peaceful solution to the war in Indo-China and called for increased external assistance to the economic development of that area as rapidly as decreasing levels of hostilities permit.

We will continue the search for peace until we have secured it, and we then hope to see the nations of Indo-China share fully in the rapid development of South-East Asia. Meanwhile the United States will honour its Treaty commitments to its Asian allies, and support their efforts to maintain peace and security in their homelands.

Over the years SEATO has demonstrated its value and it will continue to receive the strong support and encouragement of the United States.

SEATO SECRETARY-GENERAL

Lt.-Gen. Jesus Vargas

(The following are excerpts from his address)

THE South-East Asia Treaty Organization marks the 17th anniversary of its founding against a backdrop of change. I refer to the fundamental changes which have occurred over the years in the relations and attitudes of the free countries of Asia towards one another, and towards Communist China and other Communist countries.

I refer, furthermore, to the substantial changes in the great-power situation obtaining in the region of changes which have witnessed, among others, a lowering of the military profile of the Western Powers in this area, an increase in the military, cultural and diplomatic presence of the Soviet Union, and the impending visit of Mr. Nixon to Peking. More than that, these changes have indicated that varying degrees of further change are imminent, perhaps inevitable, in South-East Asia in the next decade or so.

The threat of Communism itself has undergone some change. Its forces have increasingly gone underground, switching from overt to covert aggression. The basic threat thus remains; Communist tactics only have changed.

In the pursuit of its aims of resisting Communist aggression in all its ugly forms and of improving the quality of life of the member Asian peoples, SEATO has not been oblivious of those changes. The SEATO of the 1970s is increasingly cast in the role of countering Communist subversion and insurgency rather than open aggression. Thus, while maintaining an adequate military capability to deter overt Communist aggression, we have, during the past year, improved our techniques and strengthened our capacity to deal with insurgency and subversion.

This is now our most important task and we have re-fashioned the structure of the permanent Secretariat to carry out this role successfully.

The primary responsibility for dealing with subversion and insurgency remains with the threatened country, but SEATO is now effectively staffed and equipped to advise and assist the countries under threat. I am confident that the SEATO of the 1970s, its member countries and others, will defeat Communist covert aggression as SEATO, its member countries and others successfully thwarted Communist open aggression throughout the 1960s.

Of course, we are not so naive as to delude ourselves that the frail though welcome *"detente"* between Communist China on the one hand and the United States and other Free World countries on the other constitutes, by itself, an adequate guarantee that freedom will survive and thrive in the region. This is no time to drop our guard. This is no time to take unnecessary additional risks to our freedom, forged in the privations of war but yet insecure in the crucible of peace. This is no time to betray those who handed to us freedom; and it is certainly no time to betray those to whom we must in due course bequeath freedom.

This is, however, a time to welcome every step towards world peace and understanding. This is a time to respond to every initiative from whatever source or direction to increase the prospects of peace with honour and reduce international tensions.

Unfortunately, Communist China and North Vietnam are still actively pursuing a policy of aggression. Communist propaganda is still inciting terrorism and insurrection. If the Communists genuinely want a peaceful and meaningful accommodation with the other countries of Asia, they have only to give up these tactics.

For free Asians to be guaranteed an even chance to prosper and be able to keep their cherished freedom, the Communists must, once and for all, proscribe all support for endemic Communist Parties and their insurgent and subversive activities. It is my unshakable conviction that unless Peking and Hanoi renounce their well-known aggressive policies, any improvement in the relations of any two or more powers involved in the affairs of Asia is only of marginal significance to free Asians.

SEATO, I dare say, will be the first to hail the day when the Communist threat is removed so that SEATO itself is no longer necessary and can be dismantled. Clearly, that day is yet to come.....

By providing for all possible military contingencies, SEATO has effectively deterred Communist attack against any of its members. By giving due emphasis to the task of checkmating Communist subversion and insurgency, SEATO has re-directed its efforts towards meeting this more insidious, and consequently more threatening, form of Communist aggression. It is, therefore, with a sense of no little satisfaction that I can, on this occasion, record another year of achievement by the Alliance. ■

SEATO's economic, social and cultural role through various projects from medical research to community development in regional member countries was the theme of an exhibition held in conjunction with the SEATO Film Week at the Siri Theatre, Dusit Thani Hotel, Bangkok. Above: A group of students look at part of the exhibition.

SEATO Film Week draws crowds

THE SEATO Film Week—one of several events held to mark the 17th anniversary of the Organization—was so overwhelmingly received by Thai audiences that additional performances were arranged to cope with the demand for seats at Bangkok's Siri Theatre. It is estimated that about 5,000 people attended the ten performances between September 6 and 15. Many hundreds more had to be turned away.

Subject matter of the 16 films shown ranged from archaeology in Thailand to sailing in Australia. Inveterate armchair travellers had a chance to discover or get reacquainted with peoples and places in such films as "Welcome to the Philippines" and "It is Called New Zealand."

For those interested in Buddhism, there was the "DharmaChakra," produced by Thailand's Fine Arts Department; for art-lovers, "Opus", an impressionistic survey of British contemporary offering in sculpture, painting and ballet. The mysteries of artistic creativity itself were explored in an American entry, "Why Man Creates?"

Two films, the British television production, "The Royal Family" and a light-hearted Australian feature, "Paddington Lace," depicting the mood and life style of the typically Bohemian inhabitants of one of Sydney's oldest suburbs, were repeated by special request. ■



New Foreign Minister for Australia

MR. Nigel Hubert Bowen has been appointed Foreign Minister for Australia. He succeeds Mr. Leslie Bury. The new Minister also takes over from Mr. Bury as Australia's Council Member to the South-East Asia Treaty Organization.

Mr. Bowen was born in Summerland, British Columbia, on May 26, 1911, and was educated at the King's School, Sydney, and St. Paul's College in the University of Sydney. He was admitted to the Victorian Bar in 1954. During the Second World War, he served with the Australian Imperial Force.

Mr. Bowen was Vice-President of the Law Council of Australia from 1957 to 1960 and President of the New South Wales Bar Council from 1959 to 1961. He was a Lecturer in Company Law and Taxation at the University of Sydney in 1957-58 and Editor of the Australian Law Journal from 1946 to 1958.

Mr. Bowen entered politics in 1964 when he won the Parramatta (New South Wales) seat in a by-election, retaining the seat in the 1966 and 1969 elections.

He entered the Ministry as Attorney-General in December, 1966, and became Minister for Education and Science in November, 1969. Mr. Bowen reverted to the Attorney-General portfolio in March, 1971, when Mr. McMahon became Prime Minister and made extensive changes in the Ministry. He held that post until his appointment as Foreign Minister.

As a backbencher, Mr. Bowen served on the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs from March, 1966, until he became a Minister. Mr. Bowen is married with three daughters. ■

China 中國

McMahon Outlines Australia's Policy

Mr. McMahon.."We have no hostility towards the great Chinese people...."

AUSTRALIA'S Prime Minister William McMahon outlined Australian policies on recognition of the People's Republic of China and on the war in Vietnam in a major policy speech delivered to the Victorian State Council of the Liberal Party of Australia in Melbourne.

He said the announcement by President Nixon that he would visit Peking some time before next May for talks with Premier Chou En-Lai was of profound importance to the whole of the free world.

The Australian Government welcomed the decision and would give President Nixon its complete support. Describing President Nixon's decision as a beginning and an exploration, Mr McMahon said patience as well as support would be necessary.

He emphasised, too, that the Australian Government had been active over a long period in seeking to normalise relations with China and in many cases had been in the vanguard.

Australia had made a number of practical moves to establish her position in relation to representation of China and Taiwan in the United Nations and to find a way to bring about normal bilateral relations between the People's Republic of China and Australia.

"We have done this without any surrender of our national interest or the principles which govern our conduct in international relations," Mr McMahon said.

"Our actions are predicted on the basis that we are not a great power and cannot play a decisive role in resolving the issues between East and West. But we are independent, we have a voice which I know is respected, in our region we have friendships and alliances which we want to honour. We will not unceremoniously dump our friends.

"We have closely watched the movement in the United Nations towards admission of the People's Republic and the trend towards recognition by a number of other countries in the free world—all of them, it should be noted, outside the Asian region.

"In May I announced publicly our intention to seek a dialogue with China, proceeding cautiously step by step with the normalisation of relations as our final objective. This was two months before President Nixon's announcement of his planned visit to Peking with precisely the same objectives and in much the same words.

"In May of this year I said that we would not oppose China's representation and admission to the United Nations, and in a broader context I said that it was inevitable and right that China should be a member of the United Nations General Assembly and should hold the permanent seat in the Security Council.

"I also said—and I have repeated it since—that we believed the Republic of China—Taiwan—should be

given the chance of maintaining her membership if she so desired. We have had talks with Taiwan on this matter and I hope we have been able to influence her to consider accepting proposals for retaining her membership.

"It has been suggested that Taiwan may herself decide not to seek continued membership. That, of course, would create another situation. This would be a decision within Taiwan's own jurisdiction and for Taiwan herself to make.

"It is clear from our talks to date with representatives of the People's Republic of China that the status of Taiwan is a major factor in their thinking. So it is on our part. We have repeatedly said we are anxious to preserve the rights of the 14,500,000 people of Taiwan. These include the right to continued membership of the United Nations.

"The United Nations alone can decide this issue. It is a matter for a collective decision, not for unilateral action by us. We will not abandon Taiwan, nor prejudge her position in advance of any decisions in the U.N., neither will we seek by any procedural device to exclude Peking.

[redacted]

"We have no hostility to the great Chinese people whose history and culture have contributed much to the achievements of mankind.

"I believe that, in due time, it will be possible to reach a point when we are able to recognise the People's Republic with honour and without deserting old friends. But I cannot see that happening as the first result of the first dialogue. Other decisions have to be taken. Meanwhile we want to keep moving towards normal relations with China without waiting on completion of the formalities for full diplomatic recognition.

"The Chinese responses to our approaches have clearly shown that the Chinese Government is positively interested in establishing diplomatic relations with the Australian Government. The dialogue is continuing. We are active in trade and we also want to develop our cultural and scientific relationships with China.

"So far as Taiwan is concerned, our exports have increased very substantially in recent years to about $A40,000,000 a year. We have therefore a substantial interest in both China and Taiwan for trade.

"Our position in regard to travel, cultural exchanges and sport with China is free. We do not place any unnecessary obstacles in the way of visits of Australian citizens to China, or of Chinese citizens to Australia.

"In all of this we have followed a consistent and rational policy that has placed us well ahead of most countries of the West in our dealings with China.

"We have always hoped that by encouraging contacts between the two countries in a number of lesser fields, and by private contacts between the people of the two countries, a greater understanding of each other's positions would develop and the prospects of a normalisation of political relations would be enhanced.

[redacted]

"In taking the steps that we as a Government have taken, we have always had in mind the need to consider the policies and attitudes of the many governments in our part of the world with whom we have close and friendly relations, and for whom China is in many cases an even more important factor than for Australia.

"Many of these, like Australia, do not have diplomatic relations with China. Many of them have suffered as a result of Chinese policies directed specifically against them.

"It has been obvious to the Australian Government that any precipitate move by Australia to improve relations with China could well have caused difficulties for some of the countries in the South-East Asian region.

"We have therefore taken the course of careful and constructive diplomatic groundwork, aimed at exploring the areas in which we may have a meeting of minds with China.

"I wonder how much Peking knows about the depth and scope of Australia's relations with the countries of South-East Asia. These relations are pursued for the purposes of economic development, of stability and of constructive regional co-operation among the peoples of South-East Asia. They are not directed against the interests of any country. Indeed, let me say clearly that we would not wish to exclude China from this adventure.

[redacted]

"But this Government will not prejudice the close and constructive relationships we have developed with our neighbours in this part of the world for the sake alone of better relations with Peking.

"Our relations with all of these countries are important to us and we want our friends to understand what we are seeking in our attempt to normalise our relations with China. For our part, we understand and will not

denigrate the efforts of our friends to adjust their own policies to the changing circumstances in Asia."

Mr McMahon said he sincerely hoped that when President Nixon meets Premier Chou En-Lai there would be another opportunity to bring fresh influences to bear in the search for an honourable peace in Vietnam.

"I like to think that the tragedy of this war is moving to its close, but I believe that peace with justice will only be secured if an understanding can be reached between East and West based on the Bandung Principle that each nation in the region shall be free to choose the Government it wants and live the way it wishes.

"When we went into South Vietnam in response to a request from her Government we did so in our own national interest and to honour treaty obligations. We felt that there was a real danger at that time of the whole of South-East Asia falling to Communism.

[redacted]

"With courage and determination the South Vietnamese forces have steadily taken over the brunt of the combat role, so much so that our operational role is now winding down and we can now look forward to the withdrawal of all of our combat forces.

"My wish is that this should be a matter for Parliament to consider and I shall be making a statement on our position in Vietnam during the forthcoming session.

"The withdrawal of allied forces will not, of course, solve the problems which face the people of Vietnam. A lasting peace in Indo-China can only be achieved on the basis of a political settlement in which all of the parties participate.

"If a new arrangement is to be more successful than those arrived at by the earlier conferences, there will need to be greater participation in the formulation of the arrangements by those most directly concerned, including the Governments of North and South Vietnam.

"We believe that in any future initiatives for a peaceful political settlement of the Indo-China question, great emphasis should be placed on participation by Asian countries. Stability is most likely to flow from greater Asian participation in solutions to Asian problems."

[redacted]

Mr McMahon said China and Vietnam were extremely complex issues, the importance of which no responsible government could afford to ignore.

"We believe that Australia has a real and positive role to play, and is playing it, and will play it more and more as we grow and as we identify our interests around us. But we recognise that we cannot order the world to our own specifications. Others bigger than we have much more capacity to do so. Our influence can best be exercised in concert with our friends, great and small.

[redacted]

"We will have very little influence if we behave inconsistently and with quixotic attention only to what is happening day by day. What we are trying to do is to move in an orderly and responsible way towards the resolution of these problems.

"This is the reality of the position of a country like Australia. We support what the United States is attempting. If it leads to rapprochement with China on fair and reasonable terms this will be good.

"If the Vietnam war and the problems of the Indo-China States can be approached initially with mutual restraint and then at the conference table, of course the Australian Government favours it.

"We will do all in our power to help promote international detente, but let us not deceive ourselves by exaggerating our own capacity to produce it," said Mr McMahon. ■

Holidays cut

Canton teachers are being made to carry out ten days "Mao study" and another ten days labour during their holidays, according to reports reaching Hong Kong. In Peking students have also had their holidays cut and many secondary schoolchildren have been given assignments in factories.

In many Peking secondary schools Russian has been removed from the syllabus and English is now the main foreign language being taught.

Revolutionary Rhetoric and People's Diplomacy

PEKING'S current efforts to mend its relations abroad have not noticeably curtailed comment in the Chinese press reaffirming China's commitment to world revolution, and particularly to revolutionary movements in South-East Asia.

Peking obviously seeks to reassure dissident groups in the area that China's new posture in foreign affairs does not mean any diminution of support for their causes. Chinese policy makers, however, must be faced with the dilemma of how much help China can or should give to insurrectionist movements abroad at a time when Peking is involved in improving relations with governments opposed to these movements.

Peking reiterated its support for revolution in Chinese media comment commemorating the first anniversary of Mao Tse-tung's May 20, 1970 statement on the conflict in Indochina. Mao, at that time, warned that while the danger of a new world war still exists, "revolution is the main trend in the world today." A joint *People's Daily-Red Flag-Liberation Army Daily* editorial on May 19 hailed the Mao pronouncement as representing "a programme for the anti-imperialist struggle waged by the Chinese people together with the revolutionary people throughout the world."

ARMED STRUGGLE

On the same day, Peking's *New China News Agency* (NCNA) distributed a commemorative article which proclaimed progress by Communist movements in Burma, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and North Borneo, adding that through continued armed struggle these movements would eventually "seize victory."

The blending of support for "people's war" and "people's diplomacy" in Peking's foreign policy is quite apparent in its recent posture towards Malaysia and the Philippines. Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, leader of a semi-official trade mission from Malaysia that visited China in May, reported that Premier Chou En-lai reacted favourably to the Malaysian plan for the neutralization of South-East Asia. The Tengku, who had an interview with the Chinese Premier, said that his host told him no big powers should interfere in the affairs of other countries.

In its report, however, NCNA lauded the fact that "The Malayan National Liberation Army, under the leadership of the Communist Party of Malaya, has persisted in guerrilla warfare and valiantly struck at the enemy through ambushes, mine warfare and other tactics."

MAOIST INSURGENCY

The Manila Times correspondent Amando Doronila said that Foreign Ministry officials in Peking told him that Maoist insurgency in the Philippines was an internal affair in which China could not meddle. Doronila quoted one official as saying: "If the Filipino people want revolution, it is up to them. If they do not want revolution, we cannot force it on them."

Nonetheless, NCNA's May 19 article said that the people of the Philippines could take heart from the fact that "the Philippine New People's Army, under the leadership of the Philippine Communist Party, has launched armed struggle vigorously... fought more than 80 battles with the reactionary troops and wiped out over 200 enemy men in a little over a year after its founding."

Foreign observers have speculated that Peking's public support of revolutionary groups in South-East Asia is aimed at reassuring Hanoi and Pyongyang, which may be watching Peking's recent overtures with misgivings.

The fact remains, however, that the denunciation of governments which only recently sent delegations to Peking mirrors Peking's long-held view that people-to-people diplomacy cannot be equated with State-to-State relations.

The revolutionary rhetoric also serves to point up the complexity of Peking's diplomacy. Emphasis on one aspect or another at any particular time is probably more of a sign of expediency than of inconsistency or of a new look in foreign relations. ■

Philippine Defence System in Focus

A Real People's Army

By Hermil B. Bunao

WHAT sort of an army should a developing Asian country have? A mercenary force is too expensive to maintain and impractical in the light of Asian experience. History has crystallized the efficacy of soldiery in the social, political and economic life of a nation.

Today, it is universally accepted that military skill should be conveniently integrated with civilian functions. One of the gravest dangers to a democratic country lies in isolating the military from the mainstream of national life, and concerning it solely with the development of warfare skills.

It is argued that a country is safer in the hands of soldiers who are "imbued with faith in the wisdom of using the instruments of production and who resort to weapons of destruction only when the nation is threatened with annihilation."

Perhaps no other country has followed this precept more closely, and benefited tremendously from it, than the Republic of the Philippines. Filipino soldiers, while intensively trained militarily, are invested with technical skills to increase their potentials as citizens and prepare them adequately for productive endeavours.

In addition to their basic military training, recruits of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) are taught, among other things, how to use a tractor, build irrigation systems, raise poultry, and exact the best of possible results out of modern agricultural methods.

Thus trained, recruits are sent to far-flung areas of the country to help the people undertake community development projects. Much of the physical improve-

● *Civic Action is the vehicle of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to accomplish community development projects assigned to the military, in close coordination with the people. Here military skills are being applied to bridge building in a rural area.*

● *The Filipino soldier is equally proficient in handling both the implements of war and the tools of production. Here, Philippine Army officers and men cultivate a parcel of military land to help make the troops self-sufficient in fruits and vegetables.*

● *Gun crew of a Phi pine Navy destroyer monstrates combat effic cy that won for it annual "Efficiency Awa as signified by the big painted prominently the gun mount. Naval ex cises test fleet readin in territorial waters.*

ments of Philippines' economy nowadays can be attributed to this practice.

The moving idea behind this policy is that, in the words of former Defence Secretary Ernesto S. Mata, "the soldier who helps build roads and bridges will indubitably love his country more than one who keeps himself to his barracks unaware of the problems that bedevil the national leaders."

Philippines' national defence and security begin and end with the people. This in itself is reflected in the constitution of the land which decrees the maintenance of a citizen-army.

Defence of the State is the prime duty of every citizen, and all male Filipinos, on reaching the age of 20, are required by law to register for a six-month military training. Volunteer trainee graduates are given a one-year extension of active service in the AFP's four major services—the army, navy, air force and constabulary.

Lately, the AFP has stepped up its citizen-army build-up under the new Trainee Law (Republic Act 4291). This law makes possible the increase of training output from 4,000 to 10,000 trainees a year. Trainees augment the country's regular force which is pegged at 50,000 at any given time. In case of emergency, this standing force can be increased by mobilizing the reserve troops.

Despite its unremitting efforts at improving her own defence capability, the Philippines must depend heavily on collective security for survival in the present international situation. Hence the common defence alliances

● *Besides securing the Philippines from air attacks, the Philippine Air Force doubles as a valuable tool for social and economic stability. A PAF C-47 here is shown being loaded for a rescue and mercy flight to hinterlands hard hit by a typhoon. Earlier, the aircraft was used to evacuate injured victims of the typhoon.*

she has contracted with friendly countries, notably the United States in particular and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in general.

Great reliance is placed on combat-ready First Regular (Tabak) Division of the Philippine Army. This sector of the military is efficient and capable. It is also always in a high state of readiness.

Progressive training is a daily routine, as should be the case for an armed force as modestly equipped as the AFP. Year after year officers and men are subjected to rigorous military exercises, either individually, in small groups or en masse. Training for recruits under the trainee law is no different from training reserve and regular force personnel.

Annual "mobilization dry-runs" or peacetime training in mobilization procedures, are conducted to gauge the speed by which reservists could be assembled and to update the reservists' roster.

A recent mobilization test of an infantry brigade of the First Infantry Division involved 2,600 army reser-

● *Survival and obstacle courses test the mettle of Filipino soldiers. The harder the training, the better the soldier.*

● *Part of the rigorous training of Filipino soldiers are field exercises on conventional warfare techniques and the handling of armaments. Training is often harder than actual operations.*

vists. The exercise helped make the reservists' roster up-to-date, improved the morale and honed the capability of the AFP to assemble its reserves during emergency.

Citizen-army build-up has been one of the main preoccupations of the Philippine defence forces during recent years. In 1968, for an initial troop base of 52,483, the AFP has accomplished a fill-in of 98.5 per cent of both regular and reserve components, excluding that of the Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) which saw action in Vietnam.

During the past three years the AFP trained a body of young, well-oiled reservists of around 35,337. In addition to these reserve components, there were cadre training, seminars (local and foreign) and other kinds of manpower development projects involving some 20,000 participants.

Barrio leadership seminars conducted during the same period benefited more than 15,715 rural and town residents. Still on manpower development, the military establishment trained 2,000 out-of-school youths in vocational skills and craftsmanship in military depots.

The country's defence establishment has attained a convincing posture as a protector and partner of the people through an integrated programme of good community projects, assistance in civic action efforts and the over-all nation-building programme of the government. To accomplish goals along these lines, engineering brigades and other military resources have been utilized extensively even in functions that were purely civilian in nature.

Military assistance encompassed a wide variety of public services. It covered such fields as education, vocational training, sanitation, engineering, medical and rescue operations.

Defence Secretary Mata, in a report to the President during the former's incumbency, referred to the unique role which the military and defence establishments have adopted in the scheme of Philippine society.

He said: "In consonance with the economic and social development programme of your Administration, much of the (Defence) Department's activities were, as they are now, directed toward civic action and infrastructure projects in coordination with other agencies concerned without, however, sacrificing other substantive (military) activities.

"In any event, it is felt that there is no conflict inasmuch as civic action is actually inherent in defence and internal security . . . while socio-economic development enhances these efforts." ■

PANORAMA

THE KARENS

– First Out of the Gourd

Spread across northern Thailand and Burma, the Karens are a kaleidoscopic people embracing widely diverse religions and traditions.

By Preecha Chaturaphand

THE Karens are a partly mountainous people and are of the Tibeto-Burman ethnological stock (pop. 400,000) of south-east Burma, extending into the plain of Tenasserim. Their capital is Papun. They are now living in the jungle of the eastern frontier of Union of Burma and in the western part of Thailand.

Karens are divided into many groups with different names, but those in Thailand may be classified into four ethnic divisions (the Skaw, P'wo, Bhew, and Taungthu or Taungsu Karens). They chiefly live along the valleys surrounded by hills and mountains or near the forests or brooks. Some groups live on small hills and there are approximately 110,000 in number.

Karen people live mostly in Mae Hongsorn, Tak, Kanchanaburi, and scattered throughout the provinces of Chiang Rai, Lampang, Prae, Lampoon, Chiang Mai and also in various parts of central Thailand.

The Karen regard people of all nations as being born from the same bottle gourd; the Karens were the first born and are, therefore, the elders, while others coming later are deemed the younger ones.

THE HOUSEHOLD

The Karens have a good temperament and are not savage or arrogant. They live peacefully, and are very industrious and faithful to the utmost.

Karen social structure and settlement pattern are well adapted to occupying all available land, both by their ability to redistribute population through village exogamous marriage, and their willingness as individuals or family units to move away from their relatives.

Among the Karen, as among the Lawa, Yao, and Meo, the basic unit of social structure is the household. Ideally households are composed of a husband, wife, and their unmarried children, plus a married daughter, her husband and their children.

In the hills, the ideal of matrilocal postmarital residence seems to be adhered to quite closely. A man should live with his parents-in-law for at least two or three years before building his own home, or returning with his bride to his own village. All Karen couples reported that their initial post-marital residence was in the home of the bride's father, and very few couples reported moving to the husband's village after a short period of matrilocal residence.

Ordinarily no more than two married couples live in the same household (parents plus daughter and son-in-law), and ordinarily it will be the youngest daughter and her husband who remain to care for her parents, and who may get a larger share of the real property inheritance as a result.

Affiliation with ancestral spirits is determined by descent, not by residence (as among the Lawa). Males and females inherit their responsibilities towards an-

cestral spirits, their potential positions of religious leadership, and their use-rights to cultivation in upland fields, as well as their property rights from their parents.

Although there is great stress on matrilocality, inheritance is passed from parents to both sons and daughters. The situation with regard to inheritance is mostly confused by the three factors; religious change, scarcity of land, and lack of suitable heir for the position of religious leadership.

Religious variability and change is characteristic of Karens, and there are three major religious traditions available as alternatives; a form of ancestral worship (known in Karen as 'awxe'), "tattooing" ('cekosi'), and one or another form of Christianity (Baptist or Catholic). Buddhism is available, but is not considered to be an alternative to ancestor worship or tattooing.

The choice of any one of the three alternatives has important consequences for the structure of the family, extended kinship ties, and the structure of village leadership. Ancestor worship, or more properly, the feeding of ancestral spirits, is viewed by many Karens in some parts as a particularly onerous task.

In order to fulfill the requirements of the ceremony, the family must raise separate pigs and chickens for eventual use in a ceremony. These animals can be used or eaten in this ceremony, and must be replaced if they happen to die before they are used. It is also necessary for every child of the ancestor whose spirit is being fed to participate in the ceremony—so sons who have dispersed to other villages must be summoned for the occasion.

Because of these and other similar requirements, many families have decided to give up the service of the ancestral spirits, which they do by undergoing a tattooing ceremony, the purpose of which is to "kill" or satisfy permanently the desires of the ancestral spirits. If some of the children do this and others do not, this has the inevitable effect of splitting the family since it is taboo to share in the eating of certain kinds of sacrificial meals if you are not a member of the group which sacrifices together to the ancestral spirits.

Individuals who become tattooed usually explain their actions on the basis of convenience—they are relieved of the tasks of raising special sacrificial animals, or seeking them whenever their ancestral spirits demand to be fed, and they also believe that by satisfying permanently the desires of the ancestral spirits they will no longer be subject to illnesses caused by those spirits. Another reason for conversion of this type is that it is difficult or impossible to follow different traditions within the same household thus if the groom establishes co-residence with the bride's father he will conform to or convert to his bride's tradition.

Since ancestor worshipping people cannot eat sacrificial meals with people who have given up ancestral worship it is difficult or impossible for ancestor-worshipping people to accept the authority of a tattooed religious leader. This is one feature which has affected the inheritance of religious positions and thus formed the basis for schisms within the community.

A typical Karen home nestles in a valley in western Thailand

Conversion to Christianity, of course, has the same effect, since religious leadership of the community is based on ability and willingness to dare to feed certain kinds of powerful spirits which are thought to affect the well being of the entire community.

Scarcity of land is another factor which reinforces the problem of religious differences. In the normal operation of the Karen inheritance system (as it is expressed by the people of Karen villages), it is inevitable that conflict will occur eventually over the legitimate inheritance of the position of religious leadership.

Under "normal" circumstances of an expanding population, the solution to this problem is for one or another of the contenders to the position of religious leader to found another community or colony, taking with him as many of his followers as he can collect. Under the present situation this is impossible, since there is no longer land available for new settlements to be founded. Thus, a schism, once started, finds no easy solution.

One of the paramount rules of Karen behaviour with respect to relatives is that one cannot accept the authority of a younger sibling or anyone classified as a younger sibling. The classification of seniority is very widely extended; in fact, it can probably be extended to anyone living within the community, or even to any Karen—it is possible to express the relationship between any two Karens in the community in terms of their being "younger brother" or "elder brother" or younger or elder cousin on the basis of one or another rules, the simplest, of course, being in the case of actual siblings.

But the rules may be ambiguous where they are applied to people who are not real siblings. For example, a man married to another man's younger sister will be classified as that man's younger sibling, regardless of the true relative ages of the two men. But if two men marry each other's elder sisters, unless there is some other genealogical link between the two men, each has some right to call the other "younger brother," regardless of relative age.

Another problem of ambiguity is in the case where a man marries the elder sister of the religious leader—the elder sister's husband is then classified as elder brother of the religious leader, and cannot accept his authority in respect to certain classes of spirits, nor can the elder sister's sons respect the authority of the younger brother's son. Accepting authority involves allowing the religious leader to address the spirits in the household post-harvest ceremonies, and in the feeding of ancestral spirits.

A further confusion arises when the religious leader dies without leaving a son in the community. This is what has happened quite often in a Karen village, and the basis for one schism is the question of who is the "more legitimate" heir, the former leader's daughter or daughter's son, or the former leader's younger brother's son (or sister's son). The Karen villagers have no consensus on this question, and, if land were available, the response of one of the contending parties would simply be to form a new community.

Since not all sets of parents will have sons, and since many sons move out of their home communities when they marry, it is inevitable that this situation will develop in any community which follows the rules as laid down by the people of the village. In other words, given the rules which they say they should follow, communities must be unstable. This helps to account both for the great range in size of Karen communities, and for the speed with which the Karens have spread themselves throughout the hills of north-western Thailand.

Among the Lawa, the households are the basic units of economic production, distribution, and consumption. Ordinarily they are the land-holding and land using units, and ordinarily each household makes its own swidden fields each year. The problem of sharing irrigated fields between brothers seems not to occur, but whether this is due to the fact that the Karens have a greater number of irrigated fields per household than do the Lawa, I am unable to say.

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN HOUSEHOLDS

Obligations for mutual assistance between households are much less formally structured among the Karen than among other tribes. This is related to the absence of clearly defined descent groups among the Karen and to their presence among other hill people. Households of siblings usually assist each other in the heavy tasks of farming. Siblings and children who have married outside of the village often appear at planting or harvest time to help with the labour. Otherwise, co-operative labour is on an informal exchange basis, where a day's labour is repaid by a day's labour.

According to Karen belief the house belongs to its owner, even after the owner dies, and thus must be

Marriage among the Karen is ordinarily for life. Divorce is rare and plural marriage not permitted.

abandoned or destroyed upon the death of the owner. The owner is normally the female head of household, and thus we find in one village two old widows living in small houses near the houses of their children with whom they eat, and at whose fields they continue to work as long as they are able.

At its maximum a group may include the house of a parent or parents, the households of married daughters and sons, households of sisters and brothers of the parents, plus one or more unrelated households voluntarily affiliated with the group.

MARRIAGE

Marriage among the Karen is ordinarily for life. Divorce is very rare and strongly disapproved, and plural marriage is not permitted. Remarriage after death of a spouse is permitted.

The young man does not go into the girl's house but steps underneath the floor where the girl sleeps and puts his hand into the floor's hole to wake her up. In every house where there is a daughter such a hole is specially arranged for the girl's lover. When she learns about his approach from contact made through the hole she opens the door and willingly comes out to meet him. Later on, there will be a betrothal and marriage. On the nuptial night the bride and groom feed rice and chicken to each other.

Marriage of a man to an "older cousin" (child or parent's older sibling) is not permitted. Sexual relations are supposed to be confined to marriage, but premarital sexual relations do take place, usually resulting in marriage. At least seven out of 32 male household heads were reported to have paid the fine at the time of marriage required for people who have had premarital intercourse. Several people are also reported to have violated rules regarding marriage with certain classes of relatives, but this violation is allowed to go unpunished.

Adultery is supposed to induce the wrath of the earth spirits, and requires a sacrifice of a large animal (pig or buffalo) to be paid for by the offending parties, plus a ritual distribution by the offending parties of salt to each household in the village. The entire household of the offending party (if one of the partners in adultery is adjudged more responsible for the act) should be driven out of the village in order to prevent disaster in the form of disease or crop failure from descending on the village as the result of adultery.

A situation of this type occurred in one Karen village in 1968, and after several months of debate and the payment of several series of fines, the offending woman and her household left the village. The man in the case, who claimed he had been seduced did not leave, but found it very difficult to get assistance in planting, weeding, and harvesting his crops. Another family, including one of the sisters of the offending woman, moved out of the village soon after the case began to be discussed, for fear that disaster would come to the village. Thus regulations with respect to control of sexual behaviour are another mechanism for the dispersal of Karen population.

KAREN WOMEN

All unmarried girls must wear a white gown, which extends from the neck to the ankles. White is the emblem of virginity and is comparable to a blooming flower without any insect or bee having had the opportunity of tasting the pleasure of life from its pollen!

The Karen marks of beauty are the minute "tattooing" on the back of the hands, underneath the elbows and on the calf of the leg. There is another kind of tattooing known as "medicinal tattooing," which they believe can protect one against snake poison and other misfortunes.

The Karen women are skilled in weaving. They weave a small glazed calico with a red design to be fastened above their hips, and wear glass beads around the neck and arms. Combs are stuck in the hair and earrings are also worn.

The Karen girl sews wedding suits, for herself and her future husband—two suits for herself and one suit for the husband to-be. When the time comes the bridegroom's friends will beat the gongs and drums and lead him in procession to the bride's house, where she will get a pail of water ready to wash his feet.

Then she will untangle her hair and lay down on the floor for him to tread on it. After that she will take his old patch suit and adorn him with a new suit that she has prepared in advance. She will also throw away the white gown and put on the two-piece dress of a wife.....!

RELIGION

The religion of the Karens is similar to those of the other hill tribes, but the Karens say they are not nearly as troubled by spirits as are the Meo, Yao, and Lisu, who have communal ceremonies at the time of selecting and burning the fields, during the growing season, and after the harvest.

Karen agricultural rites pertain exclusively to individual households. Some of the Karen agricultural rites may be timed according to the order of seniority within the informal kin groupings, and may follow the lead of the thipokawkesa, the village religious leader. These ceremonies are conducted on behalf of the household by the male head of the household, or by the elder male relatives to whose group the household belongs.

Each field has its ritual owner, a member of the household who is designated as "owner" of the field for purposes of the ceremonies associated with that field in that year—this person is not necessarily the use-owner

Karen children at play in a Karen village... the tribe believes that younger people are more favoured by the "spirits".

or the legal title holder of the field. The ritual owner must collect the omens for that field, plant the first and last rice in the field, and cut and thresh the first rice. Usually a younger member of the family (male or female) is selected to fill this role, for two reasons.

First, it is believed that younger people by virtue of their shorter length of exposure to the world are less likely to have come into contact with spirits and offended them, and thus may be more favoured by the spirits; second, it gives the elders a good chance to instruct the younger members of the family by having them participate in all the phases of the agricultural ritual. This may be more important for the Karens than for the Lawa, because normally a Karen can expect that a large proportion of his sons will not live in the village of his parents after marriage.

Starting young as a ritual field owner also gives an individual a chance to try his luck with the spirits. Young ritual owners who have bad harvests need not take the role of ritual owner in the future—they assign the task to their spouse or to their children after they get married, ensuring the owner of the field will be someone who gets along with the spirits, regardless of who the actual owner of the field may be.

Curing rituals of the Karen are similar to those of the Lawa, and they occasionally employ Lawa from other villages as their diagnosticians and curers. Curers or diagnosticians who are believed to have exceptional talents enjoy no particular position of power or authority outside of these roles. Although they may be feared for the presumed power of their spells, they do not

become village leaders. Among the Karen, curing involves diagnosis by detection of the spirit causing the illness, addressing this spirit and offering a sacrifice in the name of this spirit.

Ancestral spirits are believed by the Karen to be particularly troublesome, both because their care and feeding is expensive and time consuming, and also because they are believed capable of causing severe illness.

Religious change is characteristic of the Karen villagers. The most common reason mentioned for conversion away from ancestor worship is the nuisance of having to raise specific animals for the ancestor rites, or having to buy special animals for this purpose, plus the bother of attending ceremonies a long way from the village. Another reason given was conversion at time of marriage to conform to the religion of the bride.

Becoming tattooed allows an individual to stay with the general Karen tradition without the more onerous tasks of ancestor worship, and may remove a series of obligations with respect to relatives. Conversion to Christianity requires even less of its believers (in term of ritual expenses) than does the cekosi form of animism, and thus has been preferred as a means of getting rid of all obligations to potentially malevolent spirits.

Along with this are desires for literacy (in the Karen language and script), plus affiliation with a powerful, multi-purpose organization—in addition to providing literacy training.

RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP

Each Karen village should have one religious leader, 'thipokawkesa,' who has the task of dealing with the most important and most dangerous spirits. Only he has the power or courage to address offerings to the most powerful spirits; if he is unsuccessful in his offerings, his followers may leave him. He should inherit his position from his father, and for clear title to the position he should be the oldest brother (or if possible, the oldest sibling). It is not clear what should happen if a thipokawkesa dies without a male heir. Some Karen believe the position should be inherited by the thipokawkesa's younger brother's son; others believe that the position can be inherited by the thipokawkesa's daughter's husband. The thipokawkesa is supposed to be descended in the male line from one of the founding families of the village, and in fact, a new settlement is not supposed to be founded without a male member of (son of) a thipokawkesa family as the founding religious leader.

The thipokawkesa is supposed to have a helper (the two are sometimes referred to as 'head' and 'tail'), also a descendant in the male line of a founding family, but in a separate family from the thipokawkesa. The assistant can officiate at less important ceremonies.

Although the thipokawkesa inherits his position, his status is not necessarily secure unless he and his followers are successful. He should be rich, and his villagers should be prosperous, otherwise his followers may interpret his stinginess or their own crop failures as an indication that the spirits do not look with favour on the thipokawkesa. If the situation is bad enough, the thipokawkesa may simply find himself deserted. He must continually satisfy the needs of his people in their relations with the spirits by preventing epidemics and crop failures; unlike the chief samang of the Lawa, his position is not based clearly on descent from "nobility," and his function does not include the final interpretation of Karen customs and traditions.

As a result of the unresolved dispute over the position of religious leadership a number of the regular ceremonies were postponed or by-passed during the year in which I was studying the community. During this period the major aspirant to the position conducted only one ceremony on behalf of the community, the sacrifice of a buffalo to the earth spirits in the adultery case.

He was severely criticized in this ritual by many people who felt he was soliciting too much money for the sacrificial animal. They felt that if he were a proper thipokawkesa he would have been able to make a larger contribution himself, and his poverty proved to them that he was not the proper person for that job.

Meanwhile the leaders of the informal groups of households continued the ceremonies on behalf of their own groups, but some did not wait for the thipokawkesa to complete the ceremonies for his own family, as they should have done if they recognized his religious seniority. The dispute was partially resolved when one of the contenders to the position converted to Christianity.

CIVIL LEADERSHIP

It is common for civil headmen of hill Karen villages to have responsibility for several hamlets, dispersed over distance of several kilometres. This headman is recognized by district officials.

Decisions affecting the village are made at meetings of household heads called by the headman, and held at his house. Women sometimes attend these meetings, and may speak at them. There are many villages which are not well organized to perform community tasks, and there is no authority structure or sanctioning system within the village, except for public opinion, to make community decisions, or agree upon customs of behaviour and individual responsibility.

There is a feeling that each household should contribute to the effort of fighting forest fires wherever they occur within the land area used by the villagers. In some Karen villages the feeling is honoured with action, reinforced by the annual assessment of taxes for village expenses, but there are no such taxes in some other villages, and fires may simply be allowed to burn themselves out, even if

House construction, Karen style, with raised floor and sloping thatched roof.

it is known that they will decrease the yield from upland fields in later years.

LAW AND ORDER

There are frequent rumours in most Karen villages of petty thievery, especially stealing from gardens. Often the suspected thieves are opium users or addicts, but nothing is done, other than gossip to attempt to control the behaviour of the suspected thieves.

Several Karen men are reported to be opium addicts or users, and this has been the subject of occasional warnings and talks by the headman. These warnings may have had the effect of limiting opium trade within the village, and of making the users careful about where, when, and with whom they smoke and discuss smoking opium.

Village fights are common, and they usually take place after one or both parties have been drinking following a ceremony. But in some villages, no community action is taken to break up the dispute, and no fines are assessed by village authorities. A father-in-law may fight with his son-in-law, while neighbours crowd their porches to get a good view of the action!

MAKING A LIVING

The economy of the Karens of nearly every village is essentially similar to that of other hill tribes. All households in the village are directly dependent on agriculture for subsistence. Upland cultivation follows a cycle of one year of cultivation followed by six to ten years of fallow, but the population increase in recent years has shortened the length of the fallow period so that no more than six or seven years pass between periods of cultivations. The older men of the village clearly recognize the decline in yields which has resulted from the shortened fallow period.

Few of the villagers make winter gardens, preferring to buy vegetables from their neighbourhood, because, they say, garden produce is liable to be stolen. They also tend to plant fewer fruit trees in their village for the same reason, and because they do not necessarily expect to spend their whole lives in the same village.

Hill Karen villagers are less inclined to build permanent houses than the lowland Karen, and use split bamboo for siding and flooring rather than wooden planks.

Karens are mostly subsistence rice cultivators. Some households own elephants or shares of elephants, and the adult males from these households spend much time during the rainy and cool seasons using their elephants to work lumber for lowland lumber contractors or sub-contractors. Some Karens in Mae Sariang have worked in the mines.

Karens in some villages work away from the home area in order to earn cash to buy the manufactured items which they find essential.

RELATIONS WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD

For at least a hundred years the Karens in the hills of Mae Sariang district have had trade and administrative relations with the valley-based Northern Thai, and for the past 60 or 70 years with the central Thai-based administrative structure.

Burmese-Karen relationships have almost always been much more hostile than Thai-Lawa or Thai-Karen relations.

The primary mark of ethnic identity for the Karen seems to be language, and they frequently comment that even though they know some Northern Thai language, they do not like to speak it, and will not speak it unless they absolutely have to.

Many of those who aspire to education desire to become literate in Karen, the primary motivation being ability to write love letters to girl friends or boy friends in other villages.

The Karen headman is responsible for seeing that government records (residence changes, marriage, births, deaths) are kept up-to-date, and that taxes are collected Karen villagers are liable to taxation on their upland fields, their irrigated fields, guns, and distilling. They are also supposed to pay registration fees for irrigated field titles, buffaloes and elephants and for identity cards.

All Karen families except for the old widows are dependent on trade with the lowlanders. The most common item of trade is rice. This is also the chief item of trade with other upland villagers, although there is also a little trade with the nearby Lawa villagers who come to get chickens, small pigs, and dogs which they need for ceremonies, and for which they exchange money, husked rice, vegetables, liquor or yeast.

This type of petty trade is also carried on between upland Karen villages, and sometimes involves craft specialities, such as certain varieties of baskets, winnowing fans, threshing sticks, and so forth, for which the raw materials or the skill for the making do not exist in all villages.

When trading in the lowlands, those Karens who have much rice to sell often trade with their relatives or other Karens who live in the area; when they buy things they usually prefer to deal with those traders who speak Karen. Rice or money is usually borrowed in the hills either from relatives or from neighbours or from nearby villages.

Karens borrow from and lend to Karen. Rice borrowed at any time before harvest must be paid back after harvest with 50 per cent interest. Loans of large amounts of rice or money are often secured with a mortgage on the borrower's irrigated field, if he happens to own one. Lenders often arrange for their money to be paid back in rice with the interest in rice as well, which is somewhat similar to a "green rice" sale, but does not involve the pledging of a particular crop, and interest rates seem to be unrelated to market conditions.

The usual interest rate on money is three per cent per month. Often the terms of loans are quite informal, and neither the borrower nor the lender is willing to state how much interest will be collected until the debt is repaid. Apparently the rate of interest is fixed by the lender. No one in the hills makes his living strictly by manipulating credit or marketing conditions.

The desire to have a spokesman in an unfamiliar official situation is characteristic of both Karen and every hill tribe in their dealings with lowland authorities. Anyone who is assumed to be more powerful (missionary, anthropologist, or old and trusted friend or relative living in the lowlands) will be pressed into service for this purpose, and without such an intermediary hill dwelling people are extremely reluctant to seek out service from lowland institutions.

In general, Karen do not take an open attitude with respect to the outside world. They define their world as a Karen world, in which members of other ethnic groups are outsiders, and in which the boundaries between ethnic groups are or should be closed.

CONCLUSION

The hill Karens living in the villages of Mae Sariang district and in very remote villages are faced with problems very similar to those of Yao, Meo, Lahu, Aka, etc. The major problems are economic and demographic.

Their population is expanding rapidly, at the same time as their resource base is remaining constant or declining, and there is no immediate prospect for change in their agricultural economy. A more lasting solution to the problem of cash income must be sought in the work.

The agricultural situation will probably become serious within a few years so that efforts should be directed toward the development of improved upland farming methods in order to avert further rapid deterioration of soil and watershed resources and widespread starvation.■

This group of Karen children, in traditional dress, are obviously amused by the photographer's antics.

After the War in Vietnam...

Saigon must start work now on "post-hostilities" economy

This article is an edited version of a talk on "National Development" given by Brigadier (ret.) F.P. Serong to a group of Vietnamese businessmen in Saigon.

A specialist on guerrilla and counter-insurgency operations in South-East Asia, Brigadier Serong conceived and developed the Australian Army Jungle Training Centre. Between 1962 and 1965 he commanded the Australian Force in Vietnam.

In 1965, he was attached to the United States Government for operations in national development, security and political warfare. He is now a consultant in Vietnam to the Rand Corporation, the Hudson Institute and other bodies.

IT is essential that South Vietnam immediately embark on the development of a "post-hostilities" economy. A sound economy is the essential foundation for a sound political structure. There are people who will say the reverse sequence is true. Watch for them—that is Communist talk, cleverly disguised; or else it is Fascist talk, which is no better.

People tend to look at the political spectrum, ranging from extreme right to extreme left, and see it as a straight line—a linear presentation. That is an erroneous concept. The actual picture is like a horseshoe curved inwards, with the ultimate extremes so similar in organization and operation as to be nearly identical.

Some little time ago I publicly stated that in the south of South Vietnam, the vital area, the war has been reduced to a police action; it is over.

My assessment at that time surprised a lot of people—and dismayed others, including Madame Binh (Hanoi's chief negotiator at the Paris talks) who claimed it wasn't so. But now, one year later, what do we see? Where are the Viet Cong and North Vietnam's Army divisions? Who rules in Phnom Penh? Can you drive your car to Camau? Can you sleep in your parent's village? You know the answers to those questions.

Those who could not see should not be blamed. This is a field in which true experience is a rare commodity, and it is professionally safer to lean towards pessimism. But too long spent in that posture could lose us all for which we have fought for so long. Strangely enough, it is not so much the people of Vietnam who need convincing; it is more of a problem among our foreign friends abroad.

The trouble is that, with a naivete born of understandable inexperience, they lack a concept of what constitutes "the end." They sought it in negotiations—

that they could understand. World War I and World War II had ended at a table. But their minds boggled at the concept of a "fade-out." But that is what we have to deal with. Not darkness to light, as with the throw of a switch; but an effect more like the coming of dawn—a gradual brightening all over, along with patches of direct sunlight and pockets of dark shadow. Then more sunlight, less shadow. And at last the land is bright.

We are in the dawning phase. We still have a few pockets; we have fighting in the north; but in the south, where the population is dense, where the economic and political centre of gravity is located, the enemy is reduced to minor terrorism, which is itself politically counter-productive.

We must build now. We must build when we can, and where we can. We shall not wait for the last shot to be fired. If that were done, the nation would collapse politically and economically while we waited. Nation-building—reconstruction—must follow hard up behind advancing pacification. Security is not enough. Development is what makes it stick.

But how? There are big problems in South Vietnam. The first is that we have no plans. Indeed, we have no planners. There are five separate small authorities, each of which has a small slice of the action, but none has the whole charter. We started off badly on this years ago, when an overseas planning group made a long, detailed and excellent study. But it was useless.

Useless—because it was based on the concept of a nation-wide cease-fire today, and National Development beginning soon thereafter. So it was scrapped. Now, we have nothing. But we do have a recognition of that error, and a determination not to make that mistake again. That is a step forward.

And we do have a Secretary of State for Reconstruction and National Development. That is another big step. But he needs a planning staff, and this he has not got. He, and the others concerned in this field even when they make a national plan, will be faced with the major task of finding enough money to implement it. The money exists in the World and Regional Development Banking organizations and they are willing to make it available.

Vietnam needs it, and is ready to use it. But there is a missing link—there is no Development Bank to receive the money. It is like having a house full of electric appliances; having the power on the wires nearby, but no meterbox to lead it through.

In that regard, let me emphasise that *calling* an organization a development bank does not make it one. South Vietnam has three institutions which claim to be such, but functionally are no more than small loan organizations, loaded already with uncollectable debts. What *makes* a national development bank is recognition as such by the international banks. They call the tune and it is *their* money.

At this moment, South Vietnam is a nation in search of a development bank; it is in the country's best interests that this bank be found quickly because money won't sit idle for long waiting for action to be taken. Fortunately there are steps being taken in this direction.

We now come to the matter of economic climate which itself must necessarily be a reflection of the local security situation.

The money for national development must come from overseas; it is impossible at this stage for Vietnam to generate enough capital by her own efforts to do more than barely keep afloat. Even that will require special measures, and changes from the present posture. Overseas money needs confidence. It is not enough to be confident in ourselves—our friends must display that confidence.

And yet one can hardly blame them for their caution. If South Vietnam was not secure yesterday, what specific evidence clearly shows it *is* secure today? We can and should help ourselves here.

Unfortunately, for various reasons, not all good, South Vietnam has never proclaimed a "State of Emergency"; and so we cannot make a dramatic, highly visible step of ending such a state, either regionally or nationally but we could make a related gesture. There are, even now, several laws and regulations on our statutes that are no longer relevant, and indeed are no longer seriously policed. These could be grouped together, and, on an appropriate national day, abolished as a symbol of the attainment of a workable level of national security. Such an act would be a specific, towards which even the most cautious friendly nation ambassador could look, and report responsively.

That sort of action could help promote a welcome flow of economic support from our friends in Europe. But what of the giants—the United States and Japan? They will both be vitally interested in the South Vietnam pattern of development, and they will seek to influence her according to their own philosophies. These philosophies at this time are both competitive and complementary. The U.S. is pulling out, Japan is moving in. The U.S. wants to see Japan involved, but only so far as suits the U.S. Japan wants to see the U.S. pull out, but only so far as suits Japan. South Vietnam wants both U.S. and Japanese presence and involvement, but only so far as it suits Vietnam!

In this contest, which is not conducted in any sense of hostility but with a very proper, understandable and pragmatic approach to the facts of life, it is not necessarily the strongest who will prevail. Indeed "prevail" is not a good word, because the optimum solution for all would be the sum of the optimum solutions for each one. If any one is hurt in the process, all are hurt eventually.

No, it will not be the strongest; it will be the best

prepared. In this regard, our position is not unfavourable. The national assets are available; the world and the region need South Vietnam's produce. Our need is to make up our own minds now as to where we are going; what our best interests are; how we can best protect and develop those interests.

We must plan now so that we speak with one voice to a common national purpose. What do we want?

For our children we want a decent and advancing standard of living, combining the production of our own soil for which we have fought so long, with the leverage of technology, which has been too long withheld. We want the essential security to maintain and develop our standards, relying first on ourselves, with our own weapons; then on our friendly neighbours, who have suffered the same scourge we have withstood; and finally on our powerful friends–for we are not fools; we know that our enemies will not give up so soon and that they, too, have powerful friends.

The prospects are clouded. There are some major problems visible even now. First, the establishment of a balance between security and production. How many men does the nation need in her armed forces now, and in the future? How many can she afford–not only in the sense of ability to pay them, but in the sense of maintenance of a balanced labour force in a balanced economy? Subsidies from powerful friends are fine, but they may not go on forever.

I suggest that we will find both answers to be *less* rather than *more.* We will eventually need a smaller military force than now, and that is fortunate, because that is all the nation will be able to afford.

On the way down to that smaller force, with enemy pressure weakening, we will meet another problem, such as unemployment. We will need a very carefully planned demobilization programme to phase men onto the labour market at a rate it can absorb–and by categories and in locations it can absorb. Our present mobilized status is, temporarily, an economic safety valve; and will, in due course, become the essential element in the national development planning mechanism. We will demobilize, but it must not be an aimless spilling of men over the countryside. The men must go where they can be fitted into the nation's production programme.

Rice has been the backbone of the economy since before historical times, but now the world has a glut of rice. If the demobilized men are put on rice production, where will the rice be sold; If the government buys it, the country faces bankruptcy; if it does not, it faces revolution. Perhaps for a year or two, the government may use subsidized rice production as a means of stabilizing manpower, but soon it will have to face realities.

The answer to this economic riddle may be found in the production of cattle feed. Japan needs it and will buy it. South Vietnam can grow it and sell it. The diet of developing countries is increasingly moving out of grains into meats – more protein. In dietary terms the steer or pig or chicken is only a machine for turning grain into protein. South Vietnam can feed the machine instead of feeding the man.

There is more to it than that. Look at the cities; they are crammed with refugees. To talk of the day when they will return to their villages, is to mislead ourselves, for they will not return. This is not just a temporary refugee situation. It is a "revolution".

When the Communists talk of "revolution", the word has only one meaning. But there are other forms of revolution than violent subversion, and we are living through one of the other forms now. This revolution concerns the acceleration of urbanization. We may not like it but there is no going back. The days of our youth are gone.

The buffalo is replaced by the small powered tiller. The sail and the paddle in the canals are replaced by the motor–and it lifts water to the fields as well. We are facing mechanization of primary industry. Do not fight it. It is not a bad thing. And we need it to survive in an increasingly competitive world.

It does carry with it an inescapable consequence–the balance of population distribution is shifting towards the cities, because the cities are providing the service industries essential to support the new mechanized agriculture.

And these service industries will not be enough to absorb the new manpower in the cities. That manpower must produce–both for home consumption, and for export. At this stage, they must produce in the labour-intensive field, of which the textile industry is the most obvious example. It is here that we come to a real problem. The world markets for labour-intensive products, like textiles, are in the developed countries, principally the U.S. Even the U.S, which has long since passed from labour-intensive to skill-intensive, still has a local political interest in protecting its own textile industries. And Japan is pushing hard in that field, to make a U.S. market for herself.

Vietnam, and other developing countries of this region, are in danger of being bruised in the economic struggle between these two giants. The key to the future economic stability of Vietnam lies with Japanese sponsorship of a development programme, and America's blessing to it. Japan needs raw materials; Vietnam must be developed to provide what Japan needs. Vietnam cannot be developed if her labour-intensive products are not saleable abroad–primarily to the U.S. If she is not developed, no Vietnamese raw materials for Japan. This is a vicious circle that must be broken.

There is scope for, and need for, three-way diplomatic activity, with the initiative coming from the South Vietnamese Government, and any minor concessions coming from the U.S., as the strongest party. Preferen-

tial treatment for the exports of Vietnam light industry may hurt a little, temporarily, in both Japan and the U.S., but the hurt will be nothing compared with the problems to come if this developing region is frustrated in its aims.

So our national development should be based on several guidelines.

1. Subsistence agriculture is no longer the major thrust. Cash crops must be grown for export to earn hard currency with which to finance imports essential to development;
2. Population distribution will be increasingly urbanized. One man will produce on the land what five produced before—the other four will support him in the service industries;
3. Rice has no future in the world markets;
4. National Development must grow while the internal security struggle fades out;
5. The threat of unemployment must be met by controlled and phased demobilization, and
6. A balance must be achieved between military manpower and production manpower.

What about Security? Hanoi is in bad shape. Their efforts have damaged them severely; their leadership is divided; They will not give up, but they are badly weakened, and they have lost the initiative, with little prospect of regaining it.

There has also been a major change in environment. The change in urban/rural balance has removed the "sea" in which Mao's "fish" swim, and on which their strategy depends. Any new attempt by them—apart from minor efforts to make an impression in Paris or Washington—will need to be in the cities, and they have not solved the problems of conducting an urban insurgency. This is something outside their experience.

It takes the operation from a Chinese-type to a Russian-type, and they will not be comfortable in it. This gives South Vietnam a breathing space in which to prepare for a new style of aggression. The basis of that preparation is a planned, forceful programme of national development.

The vision for the future is of a decent life with security for all, based on American guarantees of support against external aggression, and joint US/Japanese market support for future Vietnam exports. The foreseeable future will involve a high degree of national readiness in the internal security field, and some degree of continued control of the economy.

It will call for leadership to point the way, and to explain the need for some continued sacrifice. It can, and should, work within a pattern of regional military and economic collaboration.

We are leaving behind the days of military struggle and are entering days of economic struggle. It will not be easy, but the problems are soluble, the difficulties are manageable. ■

Thailand, Philippines praised on economic moves

THE United States Representative on the United Nations Economic and Social Council, Mr. Bernard Zagorin, believes that the Far East "is really on the move economically."

In a recent New York statement, Mr. Zagorin said that by and large the pace of development in Asia is accelerating. He praised the major changes taking place in the Philippines and the continuing rapid activity in Thailand.

Moreover, he noted it has been planned, not fortuitous, development. Indonesia and the Philippines, for example, have taken vigorous, often painful steps to ensure proper growth.

That attitude, he said, is one reason for the Asians' success. "There is an understanding of economic opportunities. They have established the major importance and need for rapid development and are going about it in a well-organized way...doing essentially the right things. They have seized these problems with greater alacrity and greater effectiveness."

Another factor is the assistance and investment of industrialized countries: "The rapid growth of Australia on the one side and Japan on the other—and then a continuing interest by the United States and Europe—has accelerated the growth in the area."

Mr. Zagorin credits the Asian Development Bank with a share in Asian advancement. Although the bank's over-all achievement is still modest, he said, it is exerting a growing effect on development and on the attitudes that create it. Its lending has increased sharply in recent years, he noted, and it has been particularly helpful in technical assistance projects that often lead to lending programmes later on. ■

Developments
Northern H

Under the sponsorship of SEATO, Australian Gary Oughton is attached to the Tribal Research Centre, Chiang Mai, Northern Thailand, as Technical Adviser. The centre is the research, survey and data-consolidation branch of the Hill Tribe Division, Public Welfare Department, Ministry of the Interior, Royal Thai Government.



THE South-East Asian Peninsula has a well-documented and often turbulent history. However, there are important factors influencing the area in these modern times which are completely new to the scene and which are creating sudden and profound effects on long-established traditions and ways of life. These factors are population-growth and modern communications and agro-industrial technology.

Never before in history have there been so many people competing for space to earn a living from Thailand's soil-surface, and never before has mankind had such powerful technology which, if correctly applied, can bring such great social and economic benefits but which, if incorrectly applied, can trigger such tremendous damage.

In addition, the effects of agricultural advances in other countries in the region are radically altering the pattern of Thailand's traditional exports, so generating a move to rapidly intensify and diversify agricultural, forestry, and industrial production in an effort to maintain export income.

In this situation, the northern highland zone with its freedom from flooding, its temperate climate, and its not-too-dry dry-season, represents a national asset of rapidly increasing potential value, particularly from a forestry and agricultural viewpoint.

SOCIAL QUESTIONS

More than anything else the northern highlands have achieved notoriety as the scene of various outbreaks of politically inspired subversion and insurgency affecting the tribal inhabitants of the area (some of whom produce opium) who are socially, ethnically and linguistically distinct from lowland Thai.

The tribespeople's slash and burn (swidden, shifting cultivation) agricultural technique (whereby they fell virgin forest, burn it and plant crops in the clearings so produced, later moving on to make new clearings) has

Thailand's ghlands

By G. A. Oughton

also earned them disrepute for the damage they do to the national forests. (It is, however, now officially recognised that there are large numbers of upward-moving Thai swidden cultivators contributing to this damage also).

Under these conditions it is not sufficient merely to introduce improved agricultural methods in order to tap the economic potential of the highlands; the social structures and aspirations of the communities who will be called upon to utilise these methods must also be thoroughly studied and understood. Historically, the various tribal groups have lived very independently in mountainside communities with a minimum of interaction with other ethnic groups. A more sophisticated and economically-oriented way of life will require far more social interaction than has prevailed in the past; it is therefore necessary to also extend a benevolent administrative system to the highlands to encourage this development.

Had the Government been able to take such measures 10 or 15 years ago then maybe today we would not be facing the current insurgency problem which feeds upon the gap between tribal and Thai ways of life. However, this was not to be; so we are now dealing with a situation where, along with agricultural, forestry, and administrative action, the Government must also implement police and military action in certain areas in order to create a secure "environment" wherein more sophisticated forms of land-use can be implemented.

NATIONAL WATER SUPPLY

Thailand is not favoured with a well-distributed rainfall – there is an excess during the monsoon months and insufficient in the dry. Under these circumstances increase in the productivity of lowland agriculture will rely heavily on the expansion of dry-season irrigation; thus it is essential to give serious consideration to the role that the northern highlands play in the Kingdom's "water-budget".

The hills receive an average 60" to 80" rainfall each year, mainly in the months from May to October. It is the condition of the vegetation and soil covering the hills which determines whether these rains will be absorbed underground for later release as clear steady streamflow extending right throughout the dry season (and therefore useable for valuable multi-crop agriculture), or whether the storm rains will run straight off the mountains in mud-laden floods destroying crops and buildings, killing people and livestock, silting up reservoirs and irrigation channels and polluting estuarine and coastal fisheries, leaving nothing but a saline trickle in the riverbeds to quench hot-season thirst.

It is no exaggeration to say that the agricultural practices of Thailand's one or two million upland cultivators, through their influence on vegetative and soil cover of the mountain slopes, have direct effects on the ten or more million irrigation farmers on the plains, on the value of flood-prone real estate in Bangkok, on the fishing industry in the Gulf of Thailand, on the salinity-prone fresh-vegetable industry surrounding the national capital, and on the life-expectancy of the nation's hydro-electric installations.

Throughout world history, ever since man learned the use of fire, the expansion of his civilisation has resulted in the partial or complete denudation of hillsides and zones of marginal rainfall. (For instance, the sands of the Sahara once supported sophisticated cities, the now arid slopes of Afghanistan were, at one time, thickly vegetated, and the wastes of Persia were once vigorous forest).

This is not to say that the use of slash-and-burn techniques *per se* will inevitably result in devastations. Population density is the key: there is strong evidence to indicate that, at the upland population levels prevailing five or ten years ago, a viable balance had been

struck between the intensity of tribal cultivation and the rate at which soil fertility regenerated naturally, with negligible damage to the soils and watersheds.

When vacant forest-land is plentiful there is no need to crop any one clearing for more than one year; when left to itself again the clearing rapidly reverts to soil-protecting forest. But when, as is happening in Thailand now, the supply of vacant fertile land diminishes, the croppers are forced to utilise the same clearings for a series of consecutive seasons, and more intensively than before.

On flat or gently sloping land this generally results in economic development with little or no damage (rather, usually improvement) to soil and water resources. It is a different story on steep land however, where as events in the hills of south China have shown) forest that is not felled to make way for cultivation will be utilised for building and firewood purposes, the vegetation will be eaten out by grazing animals, and repeated deep vigorous digging and hoeing of the steep slopes will result, within a few years, in the complete loss of the topsoil which has taken centuries to develop from the parent rock. Agricultural exploitation of the area must then be completely abandoned.

Such changes are virtually irreversible (within the space of one man's lifetime at any rate) and we are left with a mountainside no more effective in water-absorption than the roof of a house. The original mountain-cultivators are forced into the lowlands to contend with population pressure, annual flooding, and dry-season water shortage.

When I state this situation is irreversible I mean this insofar as nature is concerned. However, I read recently that Mainland China has started a concerted move to reafforest such areas by utilising the extraordinarily laborious method of carrying topsoil by basket from the flood-plains back up into the highlands, planting trees in it, and hand-watering during the dry-season until forest growth can re-establish.

Thailand is in a more fortunate situation. While the major part of the mountain zone is by now affected by swidden cultivation, the incidence of the irreversible type of land-use is, as yet, very small. The risk is, of course, that Thailand's rapidly increasing population will compel a much wider application of this type of land-use unless effective measures are taken to circumvent it.

THE FORESTRY ASPECT

Forest cover is one of the best means of watershed protection, tree leaves and branches being particularly effective at breaking the erosive force of torrential rains. Large tracts of the upland zone are well-suited to forestry plantation which, although a valuable base for local industrialisation and direct export, is being crowded off the arable lowlands by the need of the exploding but under-educated rural population to grow subsistence crops for survival.

This segment of the population employs the only means at its disposal; i.e. the traditional methods which, while simple to pass on from father to son, are somewhat extravagant of land in terms of the crop-yields derived.

OPIUM-POPPY CULTIVATION

The much-publicised opium problem has a significant bearing on the watershed problem too. Apart from the undesirable narcotics connotations of the product, the common method whereby opium-poppy (intercropped with maize) is grown repetitively year after year in the same steep, deeply-dug fields is one of the most resource-damaging methods of agriculture practised on a wide scale in the mountains.

After opium fields are finally abandoned following soil-exhaustion, unproductive grasses take over, instead of forest trees. It is this factor, coupled with population pressure, which has given rise to today's incipient land shortage in the highland zone. It is a shortage of fertile land suited to traditional technology, rather than a shortage in terms of actual land area at this stage.

DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS

Despite the tremendous economic potential of the northern highlands, the zone is at the moment (because of the various constraints described in the foregoing) a net liability to the nation rather than being a net asset. To overcome this adverse situation and permanently increase highland productivity without destroying watersheds will require the utilisation of techniques *more* sophisticated, if anything, than those necessary in flat-land regions.

Accurately designed and well-constructed terraces will be needed for the permanent production of soil-disturbing crops such as potatoes and carrots. These can complement lowland production by growing in the 'off-season' while lowlands are inundated.

Tree-crops (such as tea, peach, and persimmon) can be cultivated in the hills to complement the agricultural production of the lowlands whose climate is not suited to growing such commodities: plantations will need to be carefully laid out and the local agriculturalists trained in the culture of the various unfamiliar plant species.

Roads will need to be carefully designed and constructed to service the timber extraction and fire-protection needs of reafforestation.

As valley cultivation intensifies and becomes increasingly mechanised, there will be less space available for grazing larger animals. The grasslands of the remoter mountain heights will have a more important part to play: the utilisation of mountain pastures will need to be carefully controlled to prevent overgrazing.

Severe though some of the social problems are, they are not insurmountable. There are sufficient similarities

The agricultural practices of Thailand's one or two million upland cultivators have direct effects on the ten or more million irrigation farmers on the plains and other sectors of the country's economy.

between tribespeople and rural Thai to arouse great hope for their economic integration into the life of the nation. It is urged that any future reorganisation of government agencies having highland responsibilities will take advantage of this factor.

An agency specialising in the highlands as a geographical region would be far more effective than one tending to widen social rifts by specialising in the problems peculiar to the various minority groups *vis a vis* the nation as a whole.

Concerning the opium aspect, it is difficult to envisage any rapid cure for this problem if viewed in isolation. It must instead be considered in relation to all the other economic, social, technical and administrative problems described.

There are plenty of agricultural alternatives to this commodity which, given improvements in marketing, transport and production-expertise, will provide cash returns per unit of area or labour equal to or better than that obtainable from poppy-growing. The normal process of integrated upland development will have significant effects on the level of opium production in the northern highlands.

A highland produce-marketing organisation would, stimulate the sought-for diversification of upland agriculture, while lastly, a heightened application of Thailand's family-planning programme in the rural areas would afford a valuable breathing space to allow the Government to 'catch up' in those social and rural development sectors in which it has been outstripped by population growth.

Mainland China has commenced expensive repairs to an upland environment which it was not previously able to control. Thailand has the opportunity to extend benevolent control to her northern highlands before it is too late, and this is the direction in which current efforts are turning.

I will now list, the measures Thailand is taking (with international assistance in some sectors) in converting her highland liabilities into national assets.

Royal Programmes: Mobile programmes of agricultural assistance, economic promotion, and medical treatment are operated under Royal Family sponsorship in remote areas, particularly the highlands, utilising helicopter transport provided by the Royal Thai Air Force and the Border Patrol Police. The programmes co-opt, on a voluntary basis, experts from many Government agencies and institutions who, under the Royal leadership, can be placed in direct working contact with the rural people, in the rural environment, with a minimum of bureaucratic procedures.

The Royal programmes are spearheading the national effort to extend social services, administration and agro-economic development to the highland areas. The programmes will be handed over to the relevant government agencies when they are able to assume full operational effectiveness in what is, to Thailand, a relatively new sphere of endeavour in a very difficult field.

Agricultural education institutions, particularly Kasetsart University, Chiang Mai University (Agricultural Faculty) and Mae Jo Agricultural College are deeply involved in the programmes of agricultural assistance and economic promotion.

Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC): This agency has inaugurated, among many other activities, an agricultural improvement programme for the tribal refugees in the various camps in Nan and Chiang Rai provinces. The programme operates through the Nan Vocational Agricultural School and, as it expands, will also be able to supply improved crop and livestock propagation materials to non-refugee highlanders.

Ministry of Agriculture: As a means of coordinating and consolidating agricultural research and extension in the northern provinces, the Ministry is to open a Northern Regional Agricultural Research Centre at Chiang Mai. One function of this centre will be to regularise highland-related research and promote the propagation of new and improved crops and livestock suited to the upland environment.

Forest Industry Organisation: In addition to its timber-harvesting activities, the organisation operates a series of forest village plantation projects in the northern foothills. Landless farmers are employed in reafforestation work, meanwhile cultivating foodcrops in the clearings and between the freshly-planted forest tree seedlings.

Royal Forest Department: This department is primarily responsible for the protection of forests and watersheds, licensing and control of timber extraction, etc. As an effort towards rationalising the current conflict between agricultural and forestry interests in the foothills and mountains, the department is preparing an integrated watershed development project. This will aim, on a valley-by-valley basis, to allocate to farmers that land in the watershed best suited to intensive permanent agriculture, thus relieving them of the need to slash and burn the areas more suited to forestry. The forest-land can then be enrichment-planted, fire-protected, and managed on a permanent sustained-yield basis.

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

Public Relations Department: This department operates the 100 Kw Hill Tribe Radio Station at Chiang Mai which broadcasts in Northern Thai and tribal dialects to remote communities throughout the northern provinces. The station has a most heartening audience-response and has a tremendous potential for aiding highland development through educational and public information programmes.

His Majesty the King of Thailand inspects plant grafting which has been taught to hill tribesmen at Ban Chomprao, Chiang Mai Province. Royal programmes are spearheading the national effort to extend social services, administration and agro-economic development to the highland areas of Thailand.

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Department of Land Development: Thai farmers with insufficient paddy-land are forced to turn to supplementary swidden cultivation on the dry plains, the foothills and the mountainsides. The Land Development Department operates programmes to offset the bad effects of this practice and to improve the economic opportunities for this segment of the rural community. Rural families are allocated land (above the reach of irrigation water) which has been mechanically cleared and cultivated and provided with road access.

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

Police Department: The Border Patrol Police provide medical, educational, and agricultural assistance to communities in the neighbourhood of border patrol posts, and BPP personnel are deeply involved in the various Royally-sponsored programmes. They operate a Hilltribe Handcraft Promotion Centre at Chiang Mai.

Department of Public Welfare: The Director-General of Public Welfare is Secretary-General of the National Hilltribe Committee and the Hill Tribe Division of this department is responsible for tribal affairs in all those areas not under the jurisdiction of the military or the border police.

The division's Mobile Development and Welfare Teams provide welfare, medical, agricultural and educational assistance to tribespeople, while Contact Teams are engaged in locating and recording each tribal community in the hills and assisting the responsible officers of the Department of Local Administration in aspects of their dealings with the highlanders. The division also operates a training centre for tribesmen and government officials, and it supports a Buddhist missionary programme in tribal areas.

The Tribal Research Centre is the research, survey and data-consolidation branch of the Hill Tribe Division. It is currently finalising studies on the traditional social, economic, religious, political and agricultural practices of the major tribal groups, and is providing technical assistance to the division's field operations. The centre's Tribal Data Project assists administration and development-planning for the highlands by producing and updating directories for each province listing the name, location, size, and ethnic composition of each highland settlement.

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION

Department of Elementary and Adult Education: Officers of this department are engaged in the preparation of new school curricula especially adapted to the teaching of tribal children. ■

SEATO PUBLICATIONS

(The following publications may be obtained, on request, from the Public Information Office, SEATO Headquarters, P.O. Box 517, Bangkok, Thailand. Special consideration is given to requests from universities and other educational bodies and institutions for bulk supplies. It is, however, not always possible to meet large orders placed by individuals.)

SEATO Annual Report 1970-71 (English, Thai)
By Lt. Gen. Jesus Vargas, Secretary-General of SEATO.

Story of SEATO (English, Thai), New Edition, 1969.
Information magazine on SEATO's military and civil activities.

Manila Pact and Pacific Charter (revised 1968).
Texts of the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty and the Pacific Charter.

Medical
Research into Disease–(Revised): Cholera (Pakistan–SEATO Cholera Research Laboratory) in English and Thai.

Research into Disease–III: Malaria (SEATO Medical Research Laboratory, Bangkok) in English and Thai.

Community Development
Report of the SEATO Seminar on Community Development, July 19-23, 1965, in English and Thai.

The Role of Youth in Asia
Report of the SEATO Seminar on 'Youth's Response to Challenges in Asia', Feb. 13-17, 1967.

Buddhism in Thailand
By R. Bhavilai. A modern Thai's interpretation of Buddhism.

Radio Writers Handbook (English, Thai)
By Madeleine C. Meyer.

SEATO Lectures
By His Highness Prince Dhani Nivat Kromamun Bidyalabh Bridhyakorn

SEATO geared to meet challenges of the 70s (English, Thai)
An interview with SEATO Secretary-General Lt. Gen. Jesus Vargas

Counter-Insurgency (English, Thai)
An abridged version of a lecture on "Counter-insurgency" given by Brig. (ret.) F.P. Serong at SEATO Headquarters in October, 1970.

Hanoi's Strategy of Terror (English, Thai)
Extracts from Douglas Pike's booklet "The Vietcong Strategy of Terror."

"Massacre at Hue" (English, Thai)
Extracts from Douglas Pike's booklet "The Vietcong Strategy of Terror."

Defeating Communist Insurgency
By Sir Robert Thompson (Thai translation)

The Changing Face of Communism
A lecture in booklet form given at SEATO Headquarters by Douglas Hyde in May, 1968.

Security in Rural Areas
Two papers in booklet form presented by Douglas Hyde at a SEATO-sponsored seminar.

What is Communism? (English, Thai)
By Michael Davis. A straightforward explanation of Communism and its objectives.

Know Your Enemy (English, Thai)
A study of Communist tactics of infiltration and suggested counter-measures.

Posters:

Seato Cares About People (English, Thai)

Better Communications for Better Living (English, Thai)

Skilled Hands for National Progress (English, Thai)

Good Health Key to National Prosperity.

Highway to Health (Pakistan-SEATO Cholera Research Laboratory, Dacca).

A Helping Hand On The Land (SEATO Agricultural Research Project).

BACK COVER:

Line-up of SEATO Military Advisers who were scheduled to hold their 35th Meeting on September 30 and October 1 at SEATO Headquarters, Bangkok—Top row (left to right): Admiral Sir Victor Smith, KBE, CB, DSC (Australia), and Lt. Gen. Sir Leonard Thornton, KCB, CBE (New Zealand). Middle row: Gen. Manuel T. Yan (Philippines), and Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya (Thailand). Bottom row: Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burnett, GCB, DFC, AFC, ADC, BA (United Kingdom), and Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. (United States).

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